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1375 
WHY IS THE JAPANESE SUPREME COURT  
SO CONSERVATIVE? 
SHIGENORI MATSUI

 
INTRODUCTION 
The Constitution of Japan, enacted on November 3, 1946, and effective 
as of May 3, 1947, gave the judicial power to the Supreme Court and the 
inferior courts established by the Diet, the national legislature, and gave 
the power of judicial review to the judiciary.  
Equipped with the power of judicial review, the Japanese Supreme 
Court was expected to perform a very significant political role in 
safeguarding the Constitution, especially its Bill of Rights, against 
infringement by the government. Yet, it has developed a very conservative 
constitutional jurisprudence ever since its establishment.
1
 It has refused to 
decide many constitutional questions by insisting on rigid threshold 
requirements for constitutional litigation and has rejected almost all 
constitutional attacks by accepting the arguments of the government or by 
paying almost total deference to the judgment of the Diet and the 
government. It is quite appropriate to claim that the Japanese Supreme 
Court has developed a very conservative, noninterventionist constitutional 
jurisprudence.
2
 
This Article examines why the Japanese Supreme Court has developed 
such a conservative constitutional jurisprudence. First, the Article will 
examine the power of judicial review and the system of judicial review in 
Japan. Second, it will show how the Japanese Supreme Court is reluctant 
to entertain constitutional litigation and how the Japanese Supreme Court 
is unwilling to apply close scrutiny or strike-down statutes. Then the 
 
 
  Professor of Law, University of British Columbia. L.L.B. (1978), Kyoto University; L.L.M. 
(1980), Kyoto University; J.S.D. (1986), Stanford Law School; L.L.D. (2000), Kyoto University. I 
would like to thank David Law for his kind comments on my earlier draft. 
 1. See, e.g., Herbert F. Bolz, Judicial Review in Japan: The Strategy of Restraint, 4 HASTINGS 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 87 (1980); Dan Fenno Henderson, Japanese Judicial Review of Legislation: 
The First Twenty Years, in THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN: ITS FIRST TWENTY YEARS, 1947–67, at 
115 (Dan Fenno Henderson ed., 1968); David S. Law, The Anatomy of a Conservative Court: Judicial 
Review in Japan, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1545 (2009); Jun-ichi Satoh, Judicial Review in Japan: An 
Overview of the Case Law and an Examination of Trends in the Japanese Supreme Court’s 
Constitutional Oversight, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 603 (2008); see also HIROSHI ITOH, THE SUPREME 
COURT AND BENIGN ELITE DEMOCRACY IN JAPAN (2010). 
 2. In this Article, I use the word ―conservative‖ to mean the unwillingness to change the status 
quo, i.e., the unwillingness of the Supreme Court to scrutinize and overturn statutes and to restrict 
other government conduct. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1376 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 88:1375 
 
 
 
 
Article will explore the historical, organizational, institutional, and 
strategic reasons for the conservative constitutional jurisprudence. This 
Article argues, however, that the most fundamental reason lies in the 
reluctance of Japanese judges to view the Constitution as a source of 
positive law to be enforced by the judiciary.  
How can we change the constitutional jurisprudence of the Japanese 
Supreme Court? Is there any way to make the Supreme Court more active? 
This Article will critically examine the proposal to establish a 
Constitutional Court by amending the Constitution. It proposes rather 
drastic changes to the appointment practices and institutional design of the 
Supreme Court in order to allow the Supreme Court to exercise the power 
of judicial review more actively. It is important to make judges aware of 
both their obligation to enforce the Constitution and the unique demands 
of constitutional interpretation. On the one hand, the Japanese judiciary 
must come to view the Constitution as positive law that the judiciary is 
obligated to enforce, no less than it is obligated to enforce ordinary 
statutes. On the other hand, judges must be reminded as a matter of 
interpretive methodology that it is not merely a statute, but a constitution, 
that they are construing.
3
 In light of the democratic principle underlining 
the Constitution, the judiciary is better off if it exercises the power of 
judicial review to promote the representative democracy. 
I. THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION AND THE SUPREME COURT 
A. The Supreme Court 
The Japanese Constitution, enacted in 1946 during the occupation after 
the defeat in the Pacific War,
4
 proclaims the popular sovereignty principle 
and declares itself as the supreme law of the land.
5
 It is a constitution 
enacted based on the draft prepared by the Supreme Commander of Allied 
Powers (SCAP), General Douglas MacArthur,
6
 and it reflects a very strong 
American influence. The Constitution vests ―whole judicial power‖ in the 
 
 
 3. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (―In considering this 
question, then, we must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding.‖). 
 4. SHIGENORI MATSUI, THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 13–16 
(2010). 
 5. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 98, para. 1 (―This Constitution shall be 
the supreme law of the nation and no law, ordinance, imperial rescript or other act of government, or 
part thereof, contrary to the provisions hereof, shall have legal force or validity.‖). 
 6. JOHN W. DOWER, EMBRACING DEFEAT: JAPAN IN THE WAKE OF WORLD WAR II 360–
404 (1999); KOSEKI SHŌICHI, THE BIRTH OF JAPAN’S POSTWAR CONSTITUTION 68–164 (Ray A. 
Moore trans., 1998). 
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Supreme Court and the lower courts established by the Diet in Article 76
7
 
and grants the power of judicial review to the Supreme Court in Article 
81.
8
 The Diet enacted the Judiciary Act in 1947 to establish the Supreme 
Court, as well as lower courts.
9
  
The Supreme Court consists of the Chief Justice, who is to be 
designated by the Cabinet and appointed by the Emperor,
10
 and the 
Associate Justices to be appointed by the Cabinet.
11
 The Judiciary Act 
stipulates that the number of Associate Justices should be fourteen.
12
 A 
Supreme Court Justice has to be over the age of forty and have an 
intellectual grasp of the law,
13
 but there is no requirement that a Supreme 
Court Justice be a lawyer.
14
 However, at least ten out of fifteen Supreme 
Court Justices must have either a combined ten years of experience as 
chief judges of the High Court or judges, or a combined twenty years of 
experience as chief judges of the High Court, judges, Summary Court 
judges, prosecutors, attorneys, or university law professors.
15
 The 
appointment is not lifelong; Justices are supposed to retire at the age set by 
statute,
16
 which is currently seventy.
17
 There is a system of public review 
for the appointment of the Supreme Court Justices: 
The appointment of the judges of the Supreme Court shall be 
reviewed by the people at the first general election of members of 
the House of Representatives following their appointment, and shall 
be reviewed again at the first general election of members of the 
House of Representatives after a lapse of ten (10) years, and in the 
same manner thereafter. . . . [W]hen the majority of the voters 
favors the dismissal of a judge, he shall be dismissed.
18
  
 
 
 7. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 76, para. 1 (―The whole judicial power is 
vested in a Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as are established by law.‖).  
 8. Id. art. 81 (―The Supreme Court is the court of last resort with power to determine the 
constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or official act.‖). 
 9. Percy R. Luney, Jr., The Judiciary: Its Organization and Status in the Parliamentary System, 
in JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 123, 129 (Percy R. Luney, Jr. & Kazuyuki Takahashi eds., 1993). 
 10. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 6, para. 2 (―The Emperor shall appoint 
the Chief Judge of the Supreme Court as designated by the Cabinet.‖). 
 11. Id. art. 79, para. 1 (―The Supreme Court shall consist of a Chief Judge and such number of 
judges as may be determined by law; all such judges excepting the Chief Judge shall be appointed by 
the Cabinet.‖). 
 12. Saibanshohō [Judiciary Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 5, para. 3. 
 13. Id. art. 41, para. 1. 
 14. Id.  
 15. Id. 
 16. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 79, para. 5. 
 17. Saibanshohō [Judiciary Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 50. 
 18. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 79, paras. 2–3. 
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As a formal matter, Supreme Court Justices are selected at the 
discretion of the Cabinet. Although the initial appointments of Justices 
were based on recommendations of an advisory board,
19
 no permanent 
advisory board was established thereafter.
20
 The Prime Minister has 
unbridled discretion to make appointments from candidates who satisfy 
the legal requirements. 
B. The Power of Judicial Review 
According to Article 81, the ―Supreme Court is the court of last resort 
with power to determine the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation 
or official act.‖21 What is the nature of this power to determine the 
constitutionality of law? 
This issue was raised in the National Police Reserve Case,
22
 which 
dealt with the Japanese Constitution’s very unique pacifism clause. In 
Article 9, the Constitution abandoned the war power and prohibited 
maintenance of any armed forces.
23
 At the time of the enactment, it was 
believed that Article 9 prohibited armed forces even for the purpose of 
self-defense.
24
 Therefore, after the SCAP dismantled the Imperial Army 
and Navy during the occupation, there were no Japanese armed forces. 
Yet, when the Korean War erupted in 1950, MacArthur had to move 
American troops stationed in Japan to Korea and was worried about the 
reduced defense capability of Japan.
25
 He thus allowed Prime Minister 
Shigeru Yoshida to establish the National Police Reserve.
26
 Although it 
was called as a police reserve, it was apparent that the National Police 
Reserve was in fact an armed force. The decision of the government to 
establish the National Police Reserve triggered very strong objections 
from the opposition parties. In this case, Diet member Mosaburou Suzuki, 
practically representing the opposition, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), 
filed a suit directly with the Supreme Court. He sought a declaration of 
unconstitutionality and an injunction against the establishment and 
maintenance of the National Police Reserve. He argued that Article 81 
 
 
 19. JIROU NOMURA, SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO [SUPREME COURT] 51–53 (1987). 
 20. Id. 
 21. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 81. 
 22. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 8, 1952, 6 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
783 (grand bench). 
 23. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 9. 
 24. MATSUI, supra note 4, at 235–37. 
 25. RICHARD B. FINN, WINNERS IN PEACE: MACARTHUR, YOSHIDA, AND POSTWAR JAPAN 
263 (1992). 
 26. Id. at 263–65. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss6/2
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gave the Supreme Court dual roles: roles as both a judicial and a 
constitutional court. According to Suzuki, the Supreme Court could accept 
a suit without any case or controversy and review the constitutionality of 
the law as a constitutional court.  
Yet, the Supreme Court had already held in a previous decision that 
Article 81 merely affirmed the power of a judicial court to review the 
constitutionality of a statute in adjudicating a case or controversy, as had 
been the practice of the United States Supreme Court.
27
 In the National 
Police Reserve Case, the Japanese Supreme Court reaffirmed this previous 
holding and rejected Suzuki’s argument.28 The Supreme Court held that 
Article 81 merely confirmed the power of the Supreme Court to review the 
constitutionality of a statute as a court of last resort when exercising 
judicial power.
29
 This means that there must be a case or controversy that 
satisfies the requirements for the exercise of judicial power in order for the 
Supreme Court to exercise the power of judicial review. Believing that this 
suit was filed without satisfying the case or controversy requirement, the 
Supreme Court dismissed it.
30
 
As a result of this decision, it was established that in order for the 
Supreme Court to review the constitutionality of a statute, there must be a 
case or controversy. The Supreme Court exercises the power of judicial 
review only incidentally to its exercise of judicial power. This also means 
that not only the Supreme Court but also all the judicial courts have a 
power of judicial review. The Supreme Court therefore held that the 
Supreme Court and all lower courts can exercise the power of judicial 
review.
31
  
The Supreme Court’s view is generally supported by academics.32 But 
the Supreme Court in the National Police Reserve Case never elaborated 
why this case lacked the case or controversy requirement. It may be 
because the plaintiff did not have necessary standing. However, as a result 
of this decision, I suspect, the courts came to believe that in Japan a suit 
seeking declaration of the unconstitutionality of a statute and injunction 
 
 
 27. See Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 8, 1948, 2 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ 
[KEISHŪ] 801 (grand bench). 
 28. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 8, 1952, 6 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
783 (grand bench). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Feb. 1, 1950, 4 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 73 
(grand bench).  
 32. NOBUYOSHI ASHIBE, KENPŌ [CONSTITUTION] 362 (4th ed. 2007); KOUJI SATŌ, KENPŌ 
[CONSTITUTION] 333 (3d ed. 1995). 
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against its enforcement will fail to meet the case or controversy 
requirement.
33
  
C. The Process of Judicial Review 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Constitution gives the 
Diet the power to define the jurisdiction of the courts, the appeal 
jurisdiction of the courts, and the permissible reason for appeal, with the 
exception that the Supreme Court must be assured the power to decide 
constitutional issues as a court of last resort under Article 81.
34
 The Diet 
has granted only limited original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court
35
 and, 
therefore, the Supreme Court mostly has appellate jurisdiction.  
With respect to civil cases, the parties can appeal to the Supreme Court 
only when the judgment below involves a constitutional violation or an 
error in constitutional interpretation.
36
 An appeal to the Supreme Court 
used to be granted also when there was a violation of Supreme Court 
precedent or any violation of law that would affect the outcome of the 
judgment, but this was amended in 1996 so that now the parties can 
merely petition the Supreme Court to accept to hear the case in such 
circumstances.
37
 Therefore, parties sometimes file an appeal and also 
petition the Supreme Court to hear the case. 
 
 
 33. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 9, 1953, 4 GYŌSEI JIKEN SAIBAN REISHŪ [GYŌSAI 
REISHŪ] 1542 (3d petty bench) (holding a suit seeking nullity of amendment to the Local Government 
Act unjusticiable); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] May 20, 1953, 4 GYŌSEI JIKEN SAIBAN REISHŪ 
[GYŌSAI REISHŪ] 1229 (grand bench) (dismissing a suit seeking declaration of unconstitutionality of 
the imperial prescript entitled ―Order on exceptional treatment of the Pension Act‖ unjusticiable); see 
also Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 17, 1953, 4 GYŌSEI JIKEN SAIBAN REISHŪ [GYŌSAI REISHŪ] 
2760 (3d petty bench) (dismissing the suit seeking declaration of the unconstitutionality of a House of 
Representatives resolution confirming the invalidity of the Imperial Prescript for Education, which 
declared moral principles for students to become royal subjects to the Emperor, because there was a 
lack of infringement of rights or legal interests); Osaka Kōtō Saibansho [Osaka High Ct.] Nov. 29, 
1985, 36 GYŌSEI JIKEN SAIBAN REISHŪ [GYŌSAI REISHŪ] 1910 (dismissing a suit seeking 
declaration of nullity of the Kyoto Ancient City Cooperation Tax Ordinance, which imposed the 
obligation on shrines and temples in Kyoto to collect admission tax from visitors to cooperate with the 
city to maintain the ancient city). 
 34. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 13, 1954, 8 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
1846 (grand bench); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 10, 1948, 2 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ 
[KEISHŪ] 175 (grand bench).  
 35. Kokka kōmuinhō [National Public Workers Act], Law No. 120 of 1947, art. 9 (indicating that 
the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction on impeachment against commissioners of the National 
Personnel Authority, an independent administrative commission to supervise national public workers).  
 36. MINJI SOSHŌHŌ [MINSOHŌ] [C. CIV. PRO.] 1996, art. 312, para. 1. The appeal is also 
allowed when there is a procedural violation in the court below. Id. art. 312, para. 2. 
 37. Id. art. 318, para. 1. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss6/2
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With respect to criminal cases, the defendant, as well as the prosecutor, 
can appeal to the Supreme Court when the court below has committed a 
violation of the Constitution or an error interpreting the Constitution, or 
when there was a violation of Supreme Court precedent.
38
 The Supreme 
Court can also accept the case when the case presents important issues in 
the interpretation of law.
39
 The Supreme Court must vacate the judgment 
below if there is a violation of the Constitution.
40
 But it can also vacate the 
judgment below if the Supreme Court found a violation of the law 
affecting the outcome of judgment, a grossly improper sentence, or a gross 
error in finding of fact affecting the outcome of the judgment.
41
 Therefore, 
sometimes the parties file a petition for acceptance of appeal.
42
 Yet, the 
defendant, most of the time, files an appeal with the Supreme Court 
alleging some kind of constitutional violation, hoping that the Court ex 
officio accepts the case and reviews the finding of facts or sentencing.  
The Supreme Court reviews a case either by grand bench or petty 
bench.
43
 The case is reviewed first by one of the three five-member petty 
benches.
44
 It is only when the Supreme Court reviews the constitutionality 
of a statute or regulation based upon a party’s argument, when the 
Supreme Court finds the statute or regulation unconstitutional, or when the 
Supreme Court departs from its precedent with respect to constitutional 
interpretation that the case must be sent to the grand bench.
45
 Otherwise, 
the Supreme Court has discretion to review the case by grand bench.  
In order to assist the Supreme Court, some thirty law clerks or research 
judges are working in the Supreme Court. Unlike law clerks in the United 
States, they are veteran judges who have more than ten years of experience 
as judges and are not assigned to individual Justices.
46
  
When a case is appealed or a petition is filed, the case will be assigned 
to one of three petty benches and to one Justice who will have primary 
 
 
 38. KEIJI SOSHŌHŌ [KEISOHŌ] [C. CRIM. PRO.] 1948, art. 405. 
 39. Id. art. 406. 
 40. See id. art. 410, para. 1. 
 41. Id. art. 411. 
 42. Keijisoshō kisoku [Rules of Criminal Procedure], Sup. Ct. Rule No. 32 of 1948, art. 257; 
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 10, 2003, 57 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 903 (1st 
petty bench). 
 43. Saibanshohō [Judiciary Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 9, para. 1.  
 44. SHIGEO TAKII, SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO WA KAWATTAKA [HAS THE SUPREME COURT 
CHANGED?] 28 (2009). 
 45. Saibanshohō [Judiciary Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 10. The petty bench can uphold, 
however, the constitutionality of a statute based on the precedent of the grand bench. Saikō saibansho 
jimu shori kisoku [Supreme Court Case Handling Rule], Sup. Ct. Rule No. 6 of 1947, art. 9, para. 5. 
 46. Saibanshohō [Judiciary Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 57; see Masako Kamiya, 
“Chōsakan”: Research Judges Toiling at the Stone Fortress, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1601 (2011). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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responsibility for that case. Then the law clerk assigned to that case will 
read all the documents, research the academic doctrines, and recommend 
to the Justice who has primary responsibility for the case whether to 
dismiss the appeal, affirm the decision of the court below, or reverse it. 
The Supreme Court will examine the case based on the explanation given 
by this Justice. Most of the appeals are dismissed without deliberation, 
based on the recommendation of the Justice who has primary 
responsibility of the case. Only a small portion of the appeals will be 
discussed in conference.
47
 
During deliberations in conference, each Justice will state his or her 
opinion. When there is a majority, the law clerk will prepare a draft of the 
opinion. During subsequent conferences, that draft will be further revised, 
and a final decision will be made on the judgment. A majority of eight 
Justices is required to strike down a statute.
48
 Unlike an opinion issued by 
the United States Supreme Court, a judgment of the Japanese Supreme 
Court will be delivered in the name of the Court, without indicating who 
wrote the opinion, while individual Justices can file concurring or 
dissenting opinions.
49
 
II. RELUCTANCE OF THE SUPREME COURT TO ACCEPT CONSTITUTIONAL 
LITIGATION 
A. Demanding Case and Controversy Requirement 
The conservative stance of the Supreme Court can first be found in its 
reluctance to accept constitutional cases. In order to challenge the 
constitutionality of a statute passed by the Diet, there must be a case or 
controversy that satisfies Article 76.
50
 The most common constitutional 
litigation in Japan is for criminal cases, where a defendant challenges his 
or her conviction based upon the unconstitutionality of the underlying 
statute.  
There are primarily two types of procedures to be followed when filing 
a suit challenging the constitutionality of a statute. One method is to file a 
suit according to the Administrative Case Litigation Act as an 
administrative case challenging the enforcement of the statute by the 
 
 
 47. See TAKII, supra note 44, at 20–25, 28–31. 
 48. Saikō saibansho jimu shori kisoku [Supreme Court Case Handling Rule], Sup. Ct. Rule No. 6 
of 1947, art. 12.  
 49. Saibanshohō [Judiciary Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 11 (mandating that each Supreme 
Court Justice express his or her opinion in the judgment).  
 50. Supra notes and text accompanying notes 29–30. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss6/2
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administrative agency.
51
 The other method is to file a damage suit against 
the government under the Government Liability Act as a civil action.
52
 
The procedure for these civil cases is set forth in the Code of Civil 
Procedure.
53
  
In order to file an administrative action under the Administrative Case 
Litigation Act, one must file a suit seeking judicial revocation against 
―administrative order,‖ and the plaintiff must show a ―legal interest‖ as 
standing to file such a suit.
54
 The Supreme Court has interpreted the term 
―administrative order‖ narrowly so that preenforcement suits are not 
allowed.
55
 Furthermore, the Supreme Court held in the Osaka 
International Airport Case that a citizen could not seek an injunction 
against the government through a civil suit.
56
 This means that the citizen 
had to file an administrative suit to seek an injunction against the 
government.
57
 Yet, since there used to be no provision for injunctive suits 
in the Administrative Case Litigation Act, the courts were extremely 
reluctant to accept injunction suits against the government.
58
 
The Supreme Court has also construed the standing requirement as 
mandating that the plaintiff have a legal right or legal interest protected by 
a statute passed by the Diet.
59
 Therefore, when the government regulates 
industries for the protection of the general public, the Supreme Court tends 
to deny standing to individual citizens because regulatory statutes are not 
intended to vest rights or legal interests to individual citizens.
60
 Although 
the Supreme Court looks into all the relevant statutes to find out whether a 
 
 
 51. Gyousei jiken soshōhō [Administrative Case Litigation Act], Law No. 139 of 1962, art. 3. 
 52. Kokka baishōhō [Government Liability Act], Law No. 125 of 1947, art. 1. 
 53. MINJI SOSHŌHŌ [MINSOHŌ] [C. CIV. PRO.] 1996. 
 54. Gyousei jiken soshōhō [Administrative Case Litigation Act], Law No. 139 of 1962, art. 9, 
para. 1. 
 55. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Feb. 23, 1966, 20 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ 
[MINSHŪ] 271 (grand bench). Yet, the Supreme Court recently overruled this judgment and expanded 
the scope of administrative order. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 10, 2008, 62 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO 
MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 2029 (grand bench). 
 56. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 16, 1981, 35 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ 
[MINSHŪ] 1368 (grand bench). 
 57. The majority, however, did not rule on whether such an injunction suit could be acceptable as 
an administrative case. 
 58. As a result of the 2004 amendment, an injunction suit against the administrative agency and a 
suit to mandate an administrative agency to act as directed are now explicitly permitted. Gyousei jiken 
soshōhō [Administrative Case Litigation Act], Law No. 139 of 1962, art. 3, paras. 6–7, art. 37-2, art. 
37-3, art. 37-4. Yet, so far, the courts have been extremely reluctant to issue injunctions or orders to 
mandate an administrative agency to act as directed.  
 59. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 9, 1982, 36 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
1679 (1st petty bench) (Naganuma Case). 
 60. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 14, 1978, 32 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ 
[MINSHŪ] 211 (3d petty bench) (Juice Regulation Case). 
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right or legal interest is protected as an individual right or legal interest,
61
 
the Supreme Court’s standing requirement is still demanding.  
In contrast to the United States Supreme Court, which similarly 
requires standing but allows suits against administrative agencies where 
there was an ―injury in fact,‖62 the Japanese Supreme Court has clung to 
the doctrine that requires proof of infringement of rights or individual 
legal interests. Even when the citizen suffers from an injury in fact, he or 
she cannot challenge the administrative action unless he or she can rely 
upon some of the statutes that could be construed as protecting the interest 
of the citizen as an individual right or legal interest. Since most of the 
administrative law statutes enacted by the Diet have no explicit clauses 
allowing the citizen to file a suit in court or any provision about judicial 
review, the citizen has difficulty in persuading the courts to construe 
regulating provisions as protecting the interests of the citizen as a legal 
right or legal interest.
63
 As a result, the standing requirement has prevented 
citizens from challenging the constitutionality of administrative actions.
64
 
Even when the plaintiff has a genuine interest in the constitutional 
issue and no one else will be able to challenge the issue in court, courts 
tend to deny standing. Courts have thus held that protesting citizens do not 
have standing under Article 9 to challenge the government’s decision to 
support the 1991 Gulf War and to send mine sweepers to the Persian 
 
 
 61. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Feb. 17, 1989, 43 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ 
[MINSHŪ] 56 (2d petty bench) (Niigata Airport Case). 
 62. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000); Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); see generally KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD 
GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 51–69 (15th ed. 2004). 
 63. See, e.g., Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 17, 2000, 1708 HANREI JIHŌ [HANJI] 62 (2d petty 
bench) (holding that local residents do not have standing to challenge the government grant of a permit 
to operate a graveyard); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 17, 1998, 52 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI 
HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1821 (1st petty bench) (holding that local residents do not have standing to 
challenge the government grant of a permit to operate an entertainment business); Saikō Saibansho, 
[Sup. Ct.] Apr. 13, 1989, 1313 HANREI JIHŌ [HANJI] 121 (1st petty bench) (holding that users of the 
private railroad do not have standing to challenge the government approval of a fare raise).  
 64. As a result of reforms in 2004, Article 9 of the Gyousei jiken soshōhō was amended and a 
new paragraph was added. See Gyousei jiken soshōhō [Administrative Case Litigation Act], Law No. 
139 of 1962, art. 9. Now, Article 9, paragraph 1, maintains the traditional definition of the standing 
requirement, while the new paragraph 2 makes clear that the existence of standing can be found after 
examination of various statutes and regulations relevant to the decision. Id. This paragraph was meant 
to clarify the meaning of the standing requirement after the Niigata Airport Case, Saikō Saibansho 
[Sup. Ct.] Feb. 17, 1989, 43 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 56 (2d petty bench), and 
was not meant to expand the scope of standing. 
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Gulf,
65
 nor do they have standing to seek an injunction against sending 
Self-Defense Force (SDF) troops to Iraq.
66
 
Moreover, the Supreme Court has applied the mootness doctrine to 
dismiss many administrative cases, including constitutional challenges. 
The Supreme Court, for instance, dismissed suits for being moot when the 
plaintiff died during litigation,
67
 when the criteria for administrative orders 
were modified,
68
 or when alternative measures were adopted to prevent 
harm.
69
 
The Supreme Court has also dismissed administrative cases by 
applying the mootness doctrine even when parties were challenging time-
sensitive decisions. In the May Day Parade Case, the Supreme Court held, 
for instance, that the action of an union organizer of a May Day gathering 
who was seeking judicial revocation of the Welfare Minister’s decision to 
refuse to issue a permit for the use of the Exterior Garden of the Imperial 
Palace for a May Day Parade, became moot when the planned date of 
gathering passed during the trial.
70
  
With respect to damage suits against the government under the 
Government Liability Act, a citizen must prove the illegality of the 
governmental action, intent to cause damage or negligence, causation, and 
damage.
71
 The citizens can recover damages from the government by 
challenging the constitutionality of a legislative action, but the Supreme 
Court once seriously limited this possibility. In the Voting at Home Case, 
a physically disabled voter sought damages against the government, 
insisting that the Diet had unconstitutionally abolished the system that had 
allowed physically disabled voters to cast votes at home and had failed to 
reintroduce such a system, thereby, in essence, depriving physically 
 
 
 65. Ōsaka Kōtō Saibansho [Ōsaka High Ct.] Oct. 29, 1991, 38 SHŌMU GEPPŌ [SHŌMU GEPPŌ] 
761. 
 66. Nagoya Kōtō Saibansho [Nagoya High Ct.] Apr. 17, 2008, 2056 HANREI JIHŌ [HANJI] 74. 
The court declared, however, in dictum, that sending the SDF to Iraq was unconstitutional. 
 67. See, e.g., Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] May 24, 1967, 21 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ 
[MINSHŪ] 1043 (grand bench) (Asahi Case). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court went on to issue its 
opinion on the merits, holding the decision of the Welfare Minister to reduce the amount of welfare 
payment as constitutional. Id. 
 68. See, e.g., Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 8, 1972, 36 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ 
[MINSHŪ] 594 (1st petty bench) (the second Ienaga School Textbook Censorship Case). 
 69. See, e.g., Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 9, 1982, 36 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ 
[MINSHŪ] 1679 (1st petty bench) (Naganuma Case). 
 70. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 23, 1953, 7 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
1561 (grand bench). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court went on to issue its opinion on the merits, 
holding the refusal to grant the permit as constitutional. Id. 
 71. Kokka baishōhō [Government Liability Act], Law No. 125 of 1947, art. 1. 
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disabled voters of their right to vote.
72
 The Supreme Court admitted that a 
citizen could seek damages based on action of the Diet.
73
 Yet, it held that 
the government should be liable only when the Diet violates the 
unequivocal language of the Constitution, a situation hard to imagine. It 
concluded that no such violation had occurred in this case.
74
 This holding 
was widely criticized for resulting in the preclusion of tort actions against 
the government based on the action of the Diet.
75
  
There is a further hurdle for damage actions. In order to seek damages, 
the citizen must prove that the government infringed upon his or her rights 
or legal interests. The failure to prove the infringement of rights or legal 
interests thus leads to the dismissal of the damage action. The Supreme 
Court, for instance, dismissed a damage action against the government that 
attacked the prime minister’s official visit to the Yasukuni Shrine as a 
violation of separation of religion and state, because the plaintiffs failed to 
show any infringement of a right or legal interest.
76
 The separation of 
religion and state is merely an institutional guarantee and is not meant to 
protect any individual right or legal interest.
77
 Therefore, one cannot seek 
damages against the government even if the government violated the 
separation of religion and state.
78
 Moreover, even when the statute is held 
unconstitutional, the damage award will not be granted unless the state 
officials were intentional or negligent in causing damage to the citizen.
79
 
 
 
 72. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 21, 1985, 39 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ 
[MINSHŪ] 1512 (1st petty bench). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. ASHIBE, supra note 32, at 369. The Supreme Court has alleviated the difficulty of seeking 
damages in the Overseas Voters Case, Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 14, 2005, 59 SAIKŌ 
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 2087 (grand bench). The Supreme Court held that the 
government was liable when the Diet failed to provide an opportunity for voting to overseas voters and 
then failed to provide an opportunity to vote in election districts as opposed to via proportional 
representation. Id. The Supreme Court reasoned that the government should be liable when the Diet 
clearly infringes constitutional rights or when the Diet fails to adopt essential measures to provide 
opportunities for citizens to exercise their constitutional rights. Id. This holding expanded the 
possibility of seeking damages when challenging the unconstitutionality of legislative actions. 
 76. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 23, 2006, 220 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO SAIBANSHŪ MINJI 
[SAIBANSHŪ MINJI] 573 (2d petty bench). 
 77. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 2, 1997, 51 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
1673 (grand bench) (Tsu City Ground-breaking Ceremony Case). 
 78. The plaintiffs claimed the infringement of the right to decide how to remember one’s family 
members without government interference, but the Supreme Court found no coercion against the 
plaintiffs from the prime minister’s official visit to the Yasukuni Shrine and concluded that there was 
no infringement of right or legal interest. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 23, 2006, 220 SAIKŌ 
SAIBANSHO SAIBANSHŪ MINJI [SAIBANSHŪ MINJI] 573 (2d petty bench). 
 79. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 9, 1991, 45 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
1049 (3d petty bench) (holding the Prison Regulation, which banned inmates waiting for trial from 
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B. Political Questions 
Moreover, the Supreme Court has refused to review the 
constitutionality of governmental action when the suit raises highly 
political questions. In the Sunagawa Case, the Supreme Court held that the 
challenge to the constitutionality of the Japan–United States Security 
Treaty and the stationing in Japan of American military forces in violation 
of Article 9 was a highly political issue and was related directly to the 
national security of the country.
80
 Such questions were not suitable for 
judicial decision, said the Supreme Court, unless the impugned actions 
were clearly unconstitutional.
81
 The Supreme Court concluded that the 
stationing of the American military forces was not clearly against the 
Constitution and therefore the Supreme Court should not address the 
constitutional issue.
82
 This decision has been interpreted as a refusal to 
rule on the merits of a case by invoking the political question doctrine.
83
 
After this decision, lower courts have tended to invoke the political 
question doctrine to avoid deciding issues such as the constitutionality of 
the SDF.
84
 
The Supreme Court once again invoked the political question doctrine 
in the Tomabechi Case, where one of the members of the House of 
Representatives challenged the dissolution of the House without a no-
confidence vote as stipulated in Article 69, and allegedly without a 
Cabinet decision to give advice and approval to the Emperor.
85
 The 
Supreme Court held that the dissolution of the House of Representatives 
raised a question of such a political nature, directly implicating basic 
questions regarding government, that the courts should not decide such a 
 
 
seeing a minor under the age of fourteen, ultra vires, but dismissing a damage claim because the prison 
chief was not negligent in light of the fact that this regulation used to be firmly established before this 
case). 
 80. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 16, 1959, 13 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 
3225 (grand bench). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. See Hidenori Tomatsu, Judicial Review in Japan: An Overview of Efforts to Introduce U.S. 
Theories, in FIVE DECADES OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN JAPANESE SOCIETY 251, 258 (Yoichi 
Higuchi ed., 2001). See generally Kisaburō Yokota, Political Questions and Judicial Review: A 
Comparison, in THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN: ITS FIRST TWENTY YEARS, 1947–67, supra note 
1, at 141, 148. 
 84. See, e.g., Sapporo Kōtō Saibansho [Sapporo High Ct.] Aug. 5, 1976, 27 GYŌSEI JIKEN 
SAIBAN REISHŪ [GYŌSAI REISHŪ] 1175 (Naganuma Case), aff’d, Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 9, 
1982, 36 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1679 (1st petty bench). 
 85. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 8, 1960, 14 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
1206 (grand bench). 
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case.
86
 This decision is more straightforward in relying upon the political 
question doctrine. These cases show the unwillingness of the Supreme 
Court to intervene in politically volatile cases.
87
 
III. UNCONSTITUTIONAL HOLDINGS 
A. Statutes Held Unconstitutional by the Supreme Court 
There is no doubt that the Japanese Supreme Court has developed a 
highly conservative constitutional jurisprudence in its sixty years of 
history, as it has held only eight statutory provisions unconstitutional since 
its beginning. 
In the Parricide Case, the Supreme Court held by a vote of fourteen to 
one that the parricide provision of the Criminal Code—which imposed the 
death penalty or imprisonment for life for parricide in contrast to regular 
homicide, which could be punished by death penalty, imprisonment for 
life, or imprisonment for a term of not less than three years—was both an 
unreasonable and unconstitutional violation of the right to equality 
protected under Article 14.
88
 Six Justices believed that treating parricide 
differently from other forms of homicide by imposing heavier sentences 
was itself unreasonably discriminatory.
89
 Eight Justices believed, however, 
that the sentences imposed on those convicted of parricide were 
unreasonably burdensome in comparison with the sentences imposed on 
those found guilty of general homicide, even though the fact that the 
punishments for parricide and homicide were different was not in itself 
unreasonable.
90
 These eight Justices were troubled by the fact that the 
courts could not suspend the enforcement of sentences in the parricide 
cases despite the existence of strong mitigating factors.
91
 
 
 
 86. Id. 
 87. Some commentators argue that the Supreme Court was rather eager to rule on the merits in 
order to sustain the constitutionality of a statute or a government action. YOICHI HIGUCHI, KENPŌ I 
[CONSTITUTION I] 540 (1998). They cite the Asahi Case, Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] May 24, 1967, 
21 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1043 (grand bench), and the May Day Parade 
Case, Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 23, 1953, 7 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
1561 (grand bench), as such examples, since in both cases the Supreme Court dismissed the case as 
being moot but nevertheless registered its opinions in dicta sustaining the constitutionality of the 
government actions. Yet, these cases are exceptional, and the Supreme Court is generally reluctant to 
state its opinion on the merits when the threshold requirements are not met.  
 88. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, 27 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 
265 (grand bench).  
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. The judge will choose a specific sentence after considering aggravating factors and 
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In the Pharmaceutical Act Case, the Supreme Court inquired whether 
the proper distance requirement for obtaining a permit to operate a new 
pharmacy or drug store under the Pharmaceutical Act was a rational means 
to achieve an important public interest.
92
 The government argued that if 
new pharmacies or drugstores were allowed to open too close to existing 
pharmacies or drugstores, rival businesses might engage in fierce 
competition, even ignoring consumer safety, resulting in harm to 
consumers. The Supreme Court was not persuaded by this argument. It 
held that there was no danger of compromising the safety of consumers, 
since drugs are heavily regulated by the government and the proper 
distance requirement was not necessary to protect public safety.
93
 It thus 
concluded that the permit denial was unreasonable and an unconstitutional 
infringement of the freedom to choose an occupation protected under 
Article 22.
94
 
In the Forest Act Case, the Supreme Court held that the provision in 
the Forest Act, which precluded a division claim of a jointly owned forest 
unless the claimant had more than half of the share of the forest, was 
unreasonable.
95
 The provision was intended to prevent balkanization of the 
forest, thus contributing to the healthy management of the forest. Yet, the 
Supreme Court doubted whether a restriction on division claims could 
actually contribute to the effective management of the forest, because it 
could simply prolong the joint owners’ management dispute.96 It thus 
concluded that the provision was unreasonable and an unconstitutional 
infringement of the property rights protected under Article 29.
97
 
In the Postal Act Case, the Supreme Court struck down a limitation on 
government liability for mishandling of mail in the Postal Act.
98
 At issue 
was the constitutionality of immunity granted to the government with 
 
 
mitigating factors from these options. When there are strong mitigating factors, the judge can choose 
the sentence of imprisonment for a term of not more than three years for regular homicide and then 
suspend the enforcement of the sentence. Yet, with respect to a defendant convicted for parricide, the 
minimum sentence would be three-and-a-half years even if there were very strong mitigating factors, 
and therefore the judge could not suspend the enforcement of the sentence. The defendant convicted of 
parricide had to be sent to jail. See infra note 124. 
 92. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 30, 1975, 29 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ 
[MINSHŪ] 572 (grand bench).  
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 22, 1987, 41 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ 
[MINSHŪ] 408 (grand bench).  
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 11, 2002, 56 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ 
[MINSHŪ] 1439 (grand bench).  
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respect to handling of special delivery mail, a peculiar kind of registered 
mail, by postal workers. The Postal Act gave immunity to the government 
even when the postal office intentionally caused damage or was grossly 
negligent in handling registered mail, while imposing limited liability only 
when the registered mail is lost or damaged and the Supreme Court found 
this immunity unreasonable.
99
 The Court decided that in light of the nature 
of the service, the government can grant immunity when the postal 
workers are negligent, but the grant of immunity when they are intentional 
or grossly negligent is inappropriate. Moreover, a special delivery mail, a 
peculiar kind of registered mail service, is often used to deliver court 
documents. In light of the essential nature of this service, the Supreme 
Court concluded that the grant of immunity with respect to handling of 
special delivery mail when postal workers are negligent was unreasonable 
and an unconstitutional violation of the right to seek damages from the 
government protected under Article 17.
100
  
In the Overseas Voters Case, the Supreme Court struck down the 
exclusion of overseas voters from participation in national elections under 
the Public Office Election Act.
101
 The Supreme Court held that the right to 
vote is an integral part of parliamentary democracy and must be granted to 
all adult citizens.
102
 Except for disenfranchisement for violating the 
election law, any other disqualification from voting or limitation on the 
right to vote should not be allowed unless it is necessary for compelling 
reasons and indispensable to secure the fairness of elections.
103
 The 
Supreme Court concluded that there were no compelling reasons to 
exclude overseas voters altogether from elections before 1998.
104
 It also 
found no compelling reasons to exclude overseas voters from elections in 
the election district even after 1998.
105
 It thus concluded that the 
deprivation was unreasonable and an unconstitutional infringement of the 
right to vote protected under Article 15.
106
 The Supreme Court affirmed 
the eligibility of those overseas voters in the coming election and also 
ordered the government to pay 5000 yen in damages to each plaintiff.
107
  
 
 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 14, 2005, 59 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ 
[MINSHŪ] 2087 (grand bench). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
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In the Illegitimate Children Nationality Discrimination Case, the 
Supreme Court invalidated a provision of the Nationality Act, which was 
discriminatory against illegitimate children in granting Japanese 
nationality.
108
 According to Article 2 of the Nationality Act, a child born 
to a Japanese father or mother was granted Japanese nationality at birth.
109
 
Yet, under Article 3, paragraph 1, an illegitimate child born to a foreign 
mother and a Japanese father could obtain Japanese nationality only after 
his or her parents got married. While the Supreme Court held that it was 
reasonable to require marriage as evidence of the connection between the 
father and the child at the time this provision was adopted, it came to the 
conclusion that the times had changed and there were no longer reasonable 
grounds to require marriage of the parents as exclusive evidence for such 
connection.
110
 As a result, the Supreme Court struck down the provision as 
being unreasonable and in violation of the right to equality protected under 
Article 14, and it granted Japanese nationality to the child.
111
 
There are two other cases in which the Supreme Court declared 
statutory provisions unconstitutional but refused to invalidate them. They 
are two Reapportionment Cases, which involve gross disparity between 
overrepresented and underrepresented election districts. In both cases, 
voters in the underrepresented districts filed suits seeking the invalidation 
of the election results, attacking the constitutionality of the underlying 
apportionment provisions of the Public Office Election Act. In the first 
Reapportionment Case, decided in 1976, the Supreme Court admitted that 
the equality of effect or worth of each vote is also constitutionally 
guaranteed under Articles 14, 15, and 43.
112
 Gross discrepancy between 
underrepresented districts and overrepresented districts was thus 
condemned as unconstitutional unless readjusted within a reasonable 
period of time.
113
 In this case, the maximum discrepancy was 1 to 4.9, and 
the Supreme Court held that this was an unconstitutional violation.
114
 Yet, 
 
 
 108. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 4, 2008, 62 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
1367 (grand bench).  
 109. Kokusekihō [Nationality Act], Law No. 147 of 1950, art. 2. 
 110. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 4, 2008, 62 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
1367 (grand bench). 
 111. Id. The Nationality Act was amended to allow an illegitimate child acknowledged by his or 
her Japanese father to acquire Japanese nationality if his or her father was Japanese at the time of his 
or her birth and remained Japanese at the time of application. Kokusekihō [Nationality Act], Law No. 
147 of 1950, art. 3. 
 112. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 14, 1976, 30 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ 
[MINSHŪ] 223 (grand bench).  
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
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the Supreme Court faced a dilemma in providing a remedy. The Supreme 
Court believed that not only the apportionment in the underrepresented 
district at issue but also the whole apportionment scheme must be declared 
unconstitutional. If the Supreme Court invalidated the apportionment 
provision and the election result, the Supreme Court feared, the legal 
status of all elected representatives might be undermined, thus casting 
doubt on the legality of the legislation passed by them and precluding 
them from amending the election statute. The Supreme Court refused to 
invalidate the apportionment provision and election result, thus merely 
declaring the apportionment provision unconstitutional.
115
 This holding 
was confirmed in the second Reapportionment Case, in which the Court 
held that the maximum discrepancy of 4.4 to 1 was unconstitutional.
116
 
The Supreme Court, however, once again refused to invalidate the 
provision and election result.
117
 
It must be noted that aside from the two Reapportionment Cases and 
the Overseas Voters Case, the Supreme Court has not struck down any 
statutes for infringement of political freedoms: freedom of thought, 
freedom of religion, or freedom of expression. Most of the statutes struck 
down were quickly revised without any political controversy, except for 
the parricide provision of the Criminal Code, which took almost twenty 
years for the Diet to delete because of opposition from the conservative 
members of the ruling party.
118
 It is rare for the unconstitutional holdings 
of the Supreme Court to have significant political implications. 
B. Unconstitutional Rulings 
The Supreme Court has also held government actions unconstitutional 
in several other cases. In the Cabinet Order 325 Case, the Supreme Court 
held unconstitutional the criminal punishment of a defendant under the 
Cabinet Order 325, which prohibited any conduct that prevented the 
implementation of the occupation policy, after the end of the 
occupation.
119
 The defendant in this case was prosecuted for violating the 
SCAP order, which prohibited the publication of Red Flag, a communist 
paper, and similar papers. The question presented was whether the 
 
 
 115. Id. 
 116. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 17, 1985, 39 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
1100 (grand bench).  
 117. Id. 
 118. MATSUI, supra note 4, at 145. 
 119. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 22, 1953, 7 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 
1562 (grand bench).  
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government could punish the defendant after the end of occupation. Six 
members of the Supreme Court believed that the Cabinet Order lost effect 
when the occupation ended and that it was unconstitutional for the Diet to 
extend its validity after the occupation in violation of Article 39, which 
prohibits retroactive punishment on legal conduct.
120
 Four members of the 
Supreme Court believed that not all prosecution after the end of 
occupation was prohibited under the Cabinet Order 325.
121
 Yet, they 
believed that the SCAP order at issue was an unconstitutional 
infringement of freedom of expression protected by Article 21, and 
criminal punishment for violation of this order after the end of occupation 
was thus unconstitutional.
122
 
In the Mandatory Debt Adjustment Case, the Supreme Court held that 
applying the Mandatory Debt Adjustment Act to a dispute about a house 
and reaching a decision without conducting an open trial were both 
unconstitutional violations of the right of access to the courts protected 
under Article 32, as well as the guarantee to an open trial protected under 
Article 82.
123
  
In the Confiscation of Third-Party Property Case, the Supreme Court 
held that the confiscation of third-party property without affording an 
opportunity for hearing was unconstitutional.
124
 In Japan, the confiscation 
of property is imposed upon the defendant as an additional penalty.
125
 The 
defendant challenged the confiscation penalty on the property of a third 
party on the grounds that it was unconstitutional since the third-party 
owner was not provided with an opportunity for a hearing. The Supreme 
Court held that the confiscation had the effect of depriving the owner of 
the property right even though it was imposed upon the defendant.
126
 
Then, the Supreme Court concluded that the confiscation of property 
without affording the third-party owner an opportunity for a hearing was 
unconstitutional in light of the property rights of Article 29 and the right to 
due process of Article 31.
127
 
 
 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 6, 1960, 14 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
1657 (grand bench).  
 124. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 28, 1962, 16 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 
1577 (grand bench). 
 125. KEIHŌ [KEIHŌ] [PEN. C.] art. 9. 
 126. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 28, 1962, 16 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 
1577 (grand bench). 
 127. Id. 
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The fourth and fifth unconstitutional decisions are concerned with the 
principle of separation of religion and state under Article 20. In the Ehime 
Tamagushi Case, the Supreme Court held that public spending on 
tamagushi offerings at the Yasukuni Shrine and contribution of religious 
offerings to the local Gokoku Shrine by the governor of the Ehime 
Prefecture were unconstitutional violations of the principle of 
separation.
128
 Tamagushi, a religious offering consisting of a twig of the 
sakaki tree, covered with folded white paper, is a symbol of sacredness in 
Shinto. In the Tsu City Ground-Breaking Ceremony Case, the Supreme 
Court established the purpose and effect test to decide whether the 
government’s involvement with religion violated the principle of 
separation of religion and state and held that the municipal hosting of a 
ground-breaking ceremony before the construction of a gym and inviting 
of Shinto priests did not have any purpose and effect of promoting 
Shinto.
129
 Apparently, however, the Supreme Court believed that paying 
for tamagushi had a stronger religious connection than the ground-
breaking ceremony.
130
 Applying the purpose and effect test, the Supreme 
Court concluded that public spending for tamagushi had the purpose of 
promoting Shinto and had the effect of giving the impression to the public 
that the Shinto shrines in question were special, thus violating the 
separation principle.
131
 
The Supreme Court also held in the Sorachibuto Shrine Case that the 
free offering of public land for the maintenance of a shrine is 
unconstitutional.
132
 The Supreme Court held that the permissibility of free 
offering of public property for the use of religious facilities should be 
decided by considering various factors, such as the nature of the religious 
facility, the historical background of the offering, the specific manner of 
the offering, and commonsense evaluation by the general public.
133
 The 
Supreme Court held that the Sorachibuto Shrine was a Shinto religious 
facility and the free offering of public property for its use was to be 
 
 
 128. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 2, 1997, 51 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
1673 (grand bench).  
 129. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 13, 1977, 31 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
533 (grand bench). 
 130. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 2, 1997, 51 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
1673 (grand bench). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 20, 2010, 64 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
1 (grand bench). 
 133. Id. 
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viewed as providing special benefit to a particular religion beyond the 
permissible limit.
134
  
What is the political ramification of these decisions? Did the Supreme 
Court provoke strong political reaction from the political process? The 
answer is no. The Cabinet Order 325 Case probably has only historical 
significance. Aside from the two unconstitutional holdings under the 
principle of separation of religion and state, the two other unconstitutional 
holdings did not have much political implications. In general, these cases 
further show the tendency of the Japanese Supreme Court to stay away 
from politics.  
C. Acceptance of Government Arguments and Deference to the 
Legislature 
In all other cases, the Supreme Court rejected constitutional challenges 
by readily accepting the arguments of the government or paying almost 
total deference to the judgments of the legislature.  
With respect to equality rights, the Supreme Court has applied a very 
lenient standard of review and upheld all the challenged discrimination 
except for the Parricide Case and the Illegitimate Children Nationality 
Discrimination Case. The Supreme Court upheld, for example, a six-
month waiting period for divorced women to get remarried after divorce 
against a sexual discrimination challenge, holding that the waiting period 
was necessary for the presumption of the father of a child born after 
divorce.
135
 The Supreme Court also rejected the challenge against 
discrimination against illegitimate children by allowing the statutory 
inheritance share of an illegitimate child at one-half of the legitimate 
child.
136
 The Supreme Court believed that this was a reasonable measure 
to protect the legal marriage.
137
 
With respect to freedom of thought, the Supreme Court has rejected the 
constitutional attack against disciplinary action on a public school music 
teacher who refused to play piano for kimigayo, the national anthem, as 
ordered by the school principal.
138
 Although she refused the order based 
 
 
 134. Id. But see Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 20, 2010, 64 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ 
[MINSHŪ] 128 (grand bench). 
 135. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 5, 1995, 1563 HANREI JIHŌ [HANJI] 81 (3d petty bench). 
 136. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 5, 1995, 49 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
1789 (grand bench). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Feb. 27, 2007, 61 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ 
[MINSHŪ] 291 (3d petty bench). 
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on her belief that kimigayo was a symbol of the aggression of the Japanese 
military forces during the Pacific War and that she did not want to 
cooperate with the indoctrination of her students by playing piano for 
kimigayo, the Supreme Court held that her freedom of thought was not 
infringed.
139
  
With respect to freedom of religion and the separation of religion and 
state, the Supreme Court has established the purpose and effect test, which 
permits government involvement with religion so long as the involvement 
remains within the reasonable limit in light of its purpose and effect.
140
 
The Supreme Court applied this test to uphold the Shinto-style ground-
breaking ceremony in the Tsu City Ground-Breaking Ceremony Case.
141
 
Thereafter, the Supreme Court sustained all government involvement with 
Shinto until the Ehime Tamagushi Case.
142
 
With respect to freedom of expression, the Supreme Court, for 
instance, upheld the punishment on advocacy of illegal action when the 
Diet believed that the violation of law could be brought about, without 
regard to what exactly the defendant had said and whether there was a real 
and substantial danger that the violation of law would be brought about.
143
  
The Supreme Court has also upheld the constitutionality of punishment 
for defamation and imposition of civil liability for defamation, even 
though it is always the defendant who must prove that the statement was 
concerned with matters of public interest, the statement was made solely 
for the public purpose, and the statement was true or at least there were 
reasonable grounds to believe it to be true.
144
 Moreover, the Supreme 
Court has upheld a judicial injunction against defamatory publication.
145
 It 
also upheld the ban on publication and distribution of obscene materials 
 
 
 139. Id. 
 140. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 13, 1977, 31 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
533 (grand bench). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 21, 1999, 1696 HANREI JIHŌ [HANJI] 96 (1st petty bench); 
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Feb. 16, 1993, 47 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1687 
(3d petty bench); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 1, 1988, 42 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ 
[MINSHŪ] 277 (grand bench).  
 143. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] May 18, 1949, 3 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 
839 (grand bench). 
 144. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 10, 1968, 12 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 
830 (1st petty bench); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 4, 1956, 10 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI 
HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 785 (grand bench). 
 145. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 11, 1986, 40 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ 
[MINSHŪ] 872 (grand bench). 
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for the protection of ―minimum sexual morality‖ and upheld the 
conviction of the publisher and translator of Lady Chatterley’s Lover.146 
In addition, the Supreme Court upheld the total ban on political 
activities of public workers and criminal punishment regardless of the 
ranks of the public workers or the nature of their work.
147
 The Supreme 
Court upheld the total ban on door-to-door canvassing during the election 
campaign, holding that the ban was reasonable and necessary to prevent 
fixing and economic burden to the candidates and to protect the residents’ 
privacy.
148
 The Supreme Court further upheld the almost total ban on the 
distribution of materials during an election campaign, holding that such a 
ban was reasonable and necessary to secure the fairness of an election.
149
 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court upheld a local public safety 
ordinance, which requires demonstrators to obtain prior permits for a 
public demonstration and prohibits any demonstration if there is a danger 
that the public safety might be jeopardized.
150
 It also gave almost 
unbridled discretion to the government to refuse the use of public parks for 
large gatherings.
151
 In addition, it upheld an almost total ban on putting up 
posters on public facilities, trees, or electricity poles on public streets.
152
 It 
further upheld the conviction of pamphleteers for trespassing when they 
entered apartment premises for distribution of pamphlets despite the ban 
on pamphleteering.
153
 
Despite the Pharmaceutical Act Case and the Forest Act Case, the 
Supreme Court has rejected all other challenges against infringement of 
economic freedoms. The Supreme Court has, for instance, upheld the 
 
 
 146. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 13, 1957, 11 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 
997 (grand bench). 
 147. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 6, 1974, 28 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 
393 (grand bench). 
 148. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 15, 1981, 35 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 
205 (2d petty bench); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 23, 1969, 23 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI 
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 235 (grand bench); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sep. 27, 1950, 4 SAIKŌ 
SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 1799 (grand bench).  
 149. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 23, 1982, 36 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 
339 (3d petty bench); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 6, 1955, 9 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ 
[KEISHŪ] 819 (grand bench). 
 150. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 20, 1960, 14 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 
1243 (grand bench). 
 151. See Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 23, 1953, 7 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ 
[MINSHŪ] 1561 (grand bench) (dictum). 
 152. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 18, 1968, 22 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 
1549 (grand bench). 
 153. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 30, 2009, 63 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 
1765 (2d petty bench); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 11, 2008, 62 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI 
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 1217 (2d petty bench). 
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proper distance requirement for a permit to operate a public bathhouse,
154
 
a permit requirement to operate a public marketplace and a distance 
requirement to prevent excessive competition,
155
 and a permit requirement 
for a liquor store.
156
 
Despite the constitutional guarantee of the right to welfare, the 
Supreme Court held in the Asahi Case that the Constitution did not mean 
to grant an individual right to seek welfare, and the government must be 
granted the broadest discretion to decide the shape of the welfare 
programs.
157
 
Overall, except for a dozen unconstitutional holdings, the Supreme 
Court has sustained all restrictions on the rights and freedoms protected by 
the Constitution. The Supreme Court never applied strict scrutiny to 
require that the restriction of those rights and freedoms be narrowly 
tailored to serve compelling state interests. It rather inquired whether the 
restrictions can be said to be reasonable and necessary and easily 
concluded that they were. The Supreme Court has never struck down any 
statutes restricting political freedom, such as freedom of expression. Of 
course, the small number of unconstitutional rulings alone does not prove 
the extreme conservatism of the Supreme Court of Japan. Yet, some of the 
restrictions on the rights and freedoms upheld by the Supreme Court of 
Japan would surely be invalidated by the United States Supreme Court, the 
German Federal Constitutional Court, or the Supreme Court of Canada.  
Without a doubt, this does not mean that the Japanese Supreme Court 
is totally insensitive to claims of infringement of fundamental human 
rights. The Supreme Court has showed its willingness to protect 
fundamental human rights by giving a narrow construction to prohibited 
conduct. For instance, in the Prison Inmates Newspaper Deletion Case, 
the Supreme Court narrowly construed a provision in the Prison Act, 
which broadly authorized a prison chief to delete inappropriate articles 
when he or she provided newspapers to prison inmates.
158
 The Supreme 
 
 
 154. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 1, 1989, 1308 HANREI JIHŌ [HANJI] 111 (3d petty bench); 
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 20, 1989, 43 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 1 (2d 
petty bench); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 26, 1955, 9 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ 
[KEISHŪ] 89 (grand bench). 
 155. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 22, 1972, 26 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 
586 (grand bench). 
 156. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 15, 1992, 46 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ 
[MINSHŪ] 2829 (3d petty bench). 
 157. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] May 24, 1967, 21 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ 
[MINSHŪ] 1043 (grand bench) (dictum). 
 158. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 22, 1983, 37 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ 
[MINSHŪ] 793 (grand bench).  
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Court held that the deletion was authorized only when there was a high 
likelihood that the order and safety of the prison would be jeopardized or 
the rehabilitation goals of prisoners would be undermined.
159
 Similarly, in 
the Fukuoka Prefecture Youth Protection Ordinance Case, the Supreme 
Court narrowly construed the unbridled ban on sexual intercourse with 
youth as authorizing criminal punishment only when defendants deceived 
youth into sexual intercourse or when defendants had sexual intercourse 
with youth simply to gratify their sexual desires.
160
 
The Supreme Court has also showed its willingness to protect 
individual rights by employing the abuse of discretion doctrine on a 
nonconstitutional basis. For instance, in the Jehovah’s Witness Kendo 
Refusal Case, the Supreme Court held that a public high school was not 
allowed to expel a student who refused to practice kendo, Japanese 
fencing, as a part of a physical education class because of his religious 
belief against fighting.
161
 The Supreme Court believed that the expulsion 
should be a means of last resort and that the school abused its discretion 
when it refused to provide the student alternative means to receive 
credit.
162
 The Supreme Court also held, in the third Ienaga School 
Textbook Censorship Case, that an order of the Education Minister to 
delete the description of biochemical experiments by Japanese military 
forces in China during the Pacific War as a condition to approve the 
history textbook submitted for review was an abuse of discretion and 
illegal, although it rejected the constitutional attack on the school textbook 
review system.
163
 The Supreme Court believed that the incident was 
common knowledge among historians and there was no reason for 
ordering its deletion.
164
 
Yet, the fact remains that the Japanese Supreme Court has been 
extremely reluctant to strike down legislation or other governmental 
actions on constitutional grounds. Why has the Japanese Supreme Court 
developed such a conservative constitutional jurisprudence? Is such 
extreme judicial passivism justified? 
 
 
 159. Id. 
 160. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 23, 1985, 39 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 
413 (grand bench).  
 161. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 8, 1996, 50 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
469 (2d petty bench).  
 162. Id. 
 163. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Aug. 29, 1997, 51 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ 
[MINSHŪ] 2921 (3d petty bench).  
 164. Id. 
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IV. WHY HAS THE JAPANESE SUPREME COURT DEVELOPED A 
CONSERVATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE? 
A. Cultural Reasons 
Former Justice Masami Itoh, who was also a professor of Anglo-
American Law at the Tokyo University Faculty of Law, pointed out 
several factors that he believed might have contributed to the extreme 
judicial passivism of the Supreme Court.
165
 One of these factors is the 
philosophy of respect for harmony in Japanese culture.
166
 According to 
Itoh, in Japanese society, harmony of a group is much respected, and even 
the Supreme Court is inclined to respect the judgment of the Diet and 
administrative agencies out of respect for harmony.
167
 Or one may say, 
because of the emphasis on harmony, it might be difficult for the minority 
members on the bench to strongly disagree with the majority. 
Yet, it is doubtful whether such a cultural reason plays a significant 
role in the extreme conservatism of the Supreme Court of Japan. Even 
though harmony should be respected, there are strong dissents among the 
Justices, and there is no reason to believe that the Supreme Court is 
upholding the statutes for the sake of harmony. After all, there is no reason 
why it is always the Supreme Court that must back off in order to pay 
respect to the political branch. I believe that the historical, organizational, 
institutional, and strategic reasons play much greater roles than the cultural 
reason.  
B. Historical Reasons 
I believe that the root cause of judicial passivism of the Supreme Court 
is the lack of understanding of the power of judicial review among Justices 
who were initially appointed to the Supreme Court. Although many public 
officials who cooperated with the government during the Pacific War and 
had a ultraconservative or militarist ideology were expelled from the 
government during the occupation, no judges were expelled from their 
jobs even though most of them cooperated with the government under the 
Meiji Constitution to punish citizens for their refusal to cooperate with the 
 
 
 165. MASAMI ITOH, SAIBANKAN TO GAKUSHA NO AIDA [BETWEEN A JUSTICE AND A 
SCHOLAR] (1993). 
 166. Id. at 116–18. 
 167. Id. 
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government in its war effort.
168
 Moreover, judges, prosecutors, and 
attorneys who were accustomed to the traditional German constitutional 
philosophy staffed the initial Supreme Court.
169
 One of the hallmarks of 
prewar judges is their positivism. The judges were supposed to apply the 
statutes, and there was no tradition in German positivist jurisprudence that 
allowed judicial judges to strike down statutes in the name of the 
Constitution. They simply brought their traditional positivist constitutional 
philosophy to the newly created Supreme Court. Furthermore, they did not 
know the practice of judicial review in the United States. It is no wonder 
that the Supreme Court simply rejected all constitutional challenges filed 
by citizens after the adoption of the current Japanese Constitution, since it 
had no experience with enforcing the Constitution against the Diet. 
Moreover, after the establishment of the Supreme Court, defendants 
were not allowed to challenge the finding of fact and improper sentencing 
before the Supreme Court,
170
 unlike before the Supreme Court of 
Judicature. They thus filed appeals insisting on constitutional violations in 
order to attract the Supreme Court’s attention to the erroneous finding of 
fact or improper sentencing. Some of their arguments were poorly crafted 
and utterly ridiculous. Some defendants challenged their convictions as a 
violation of Chapter 3 of the Constitution, a Bill of Rights, without 
specifying which rights were infringed. Some defendants challenged their 
convictions as a violation of renunciation of war and prohibition of armed 
forces provided in Article 9. Some defendants challenged their convictions 
as a violation of the welfare right protected in Article 25, arguing that, if 
convicted, their families would not be able to live a decent living. 
Unfortunately, since the Supreme Court did not have discretion to 
refuse appeals, the Supreme Court simply accepted them and rejected all 
of them on the merits, thus creating a jurisprudence of upholding the 
constitutionality of various statutes. The conservative constitutional 
jurisprudence was thus established. There is an old saying in Japan: A 
drowning man will catch at a straw. A desperate person indeed attempts 
the hopeless thing. A constitutional argument perhaps looked for the 
 
 
 168. JIRO NOMURA, NIHON NO SAIBANKAN [JAPANESE JUDGES] 172 (1994). 
 169. NOMURA, supra note 19, at 156. For a process of initial appointment and the behind-the-
scenes battle between judges who planned for a radical reform and judges who were opposed to a 
radical reform, see D.J. Danelski, Saikō saibansho no seitan [The Creation of the Japanese Supreme 
Court], translated by Takeo Hayakawa in KON-NICHI NO SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO: GENTEN TO GENTEN [THE 
SUPREME COURT TODAY: ORIGINS AND THE PRESENT] 183 (Hogaku Seminar Special Issue 1988).  
 170. Supra note 38. 
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Justices as a meaningless last straw the defendant catches when he or she 
cannot make other, more solid legal arguments under the statute.
171
 
Of course, with the change of time, the Supreme Court could have 
changed its constitutional philosophy. Indeed, the Supreme Court showed 
some indication of change in the 1960s. The majority of Justices came to 
review the constitutionality of infringement of individual rights more 
carefully, as it did in the All Postal Workers, Tokyo Central Post Office 
Case.
172
 In Japan, all public workers, regardless of the nature of their jobs 
or their ranks, are prohibited from striking,
173
 despite the constitutional 
guarantee of the right to strike in Article 28 of the Constitution. There is 
also a criminal punishment on those who conspire, solicit, advocate, or 
plan such illegal strikes.
174
 Postal workers were employees of a public 
corporation, and strikes were prohibited under the Public Corporation and 
State Managed Company Workers Labor Relations Act.
175
 Yet, there was 
no criminal punishment for organizing illegal strikes. The defendants, 
union leaders, were prosecuted for violating the Postal Act, which 
penalized postal workers with criminal punishment for refusing to provide 
postal service,
176
 when they urged other members to attend a gathering 
during work hours. The Supreme Court believed that public workers were 
also entitled to the rights of workers under Article 28 of the 
Constitution.
177
 Although it allowed the restriction of these rights in light 
of the public interest, it limited the permissible scope of restriction to a 
reasonable minimum after balancing the rights of workers against securing 
the public interest.
178
 It also held that criminal punishment for the 
 
 
 171. ITOH, supra note 165, at 124–25. 
 172. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 26, 1966, 20 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 
901 (grand bench).  
 173. Kokka kōmuinhō [National Public Workers Act], Law No. 120 of 1947, art. 98, para. 2; 
Chihō kōmuinhō [Local Public Workers Act], Law No. of 261 of 1950, art. 37.  
 174. Kokka kōmuinhō [National Public Workers Act], Law No. 120 of 1947, art. 110, para. 17; 
Chihō kōmuinhō [Local Public Workers Act], Law No. of 261 of 1950, art. 61, para. 4. 
 175. Kōkyōkigyōtaitō rōdōkankeihō [Public Corporation and State Managed Company Workers 
Labor Relations Act], Law No. 257 of 1948, art. 17. This statute was originally enacted as 
Kōkyōkigyōtai rōdōkankeihō [State Managed Company Workers Labor Relations Act] in 1948. In 
1986, it was renamed as Kokueikigyō rōdōkankeihō [State Managed Company Workers Labor 
Relations Act]. In 2001, it was again renamed as Kokueikigyō oyobi tokutei dokuritsugyōseihōjin no 
rōdōkankei nikansuru hōritsu [Act Concerning Labor Relations in State Managed Company and 
Specified Independent Administrative Corporation], and in 2003, it became Tokutei 
dokuritsugyōseihōjintō no rōdōkankei nikansuru hōritsu [Act on Labor Relationship of Specified 
Independent Administrative Corporation]. 
 176. Yūbinhō [Postal Act], Law No. 165 of 1947, art. 79, para. 1. 
 177. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 26, 1966, 20 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 
901 (grand bench). 
 178. Id. 
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violations should be limited to a minimum and narrowly construed the 
Postal Act as criminalizing only seriously illegal conduct such as violent 
strikes, strikes for purposes other than legitimate union activity, or 
improperly prolonged strikes.
179
  
Although the Supreme Court upheld the ban on strikes by public 
corporation workers, it gave a landmark decision that showed its 
willingness to narrow the permissible scope of the ban on strikes and the 
criminal punishment. In later cases, the Supreme Court applied this 
judgment to local public workers
180
 and national public workers.
181
  
However, this decision triggered tremendous backlash from 
conservative politicians. The Japanese government had been long 
dominated by the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) ever since 
its creation in 1955, except for a short period of time in 1993 and 1994, 
until it was finally defeated by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in 
2009.
182
 Conservative politicians of the LDP were deeply upset by the All 
Postal Workers, Tokyo Central Post Office Case decision and other 
decisions of the lower courts that refused the detention of radical students 
who participated in student movements.
183
 Conservative politicians 
criticized the Supreme Court as politically biased and demanded that the 
government use more careful screening before making an appointment to 
the Supreme Court.
184
 
With increasing criticism from the ruling party and conservative critics, 
the Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Kazuto Ishida, came to maintain 
its independence mainly through keeping distance from politics. The 
Supreme Court practically overturned the All Postal Workers, Tokyo 
Central Post Office Case in the All Forest and Agricultural Workers, 
Police Office Act Amendment Opposition Case.
185
 Defendants were union 
leaders of all national agricultural and forest public workers and were 
prosecuted under the National Public Workers Act for soliciting an illegal 
strike by urging other members to participate in a gathering during work 
 
 
 179. Id. It must be noted that the postal service is now privatized and the postal workers are no 
longer public workers. Their strike is no longer prohibited. 
 180. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 2, 1969, 23 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 
305 (grand bench). 
 181. Id. 
 182. For the dominance of the LDP in the postwar history of Japan, see generally LOUIS D. 
HAYES, INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE POLITICS 71–85 (5th ed. 2009); J.A.A. STOCKWIN, 
GOVERNING JAPAN: DIVIDED POLITICS IN A RESURGENT ECONOMY 63–134 (4th ed. 2008). 
 183. NOMURA, supra note 19, at 172.  
 184. Id. at 77–78. 
 185. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 25, 1973, 27 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 
547 (grand bench). 
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hours against the then-proposed amendment to the Police Office Act. The 
Supreme Court held that strikes by public workers were incompatible with 
the public nature of their jobs and seriously affected the common interest 
of the public, regardless of the workers’ jobs or ranks.186 Moreover, since 
the labor relationship between the government and public workers had to 
be regulated by statute, strikes by public workers would undermine the 
process of representative democracy, forcing the Diet to bow to the 
demands of unions through the threat of strikes.
187
 Finally, the Supreme 
Court stated that there was no limitation on strikes by public workers 
based on market mechanisms.
188
 As a result, the Supreme Court upheld the 
total ban on strikes.
189
 It further rejected the limiting construction of the 
All Postal Workers, Tokyo Central Post Office Case on the scope of 
criminal punishment as violating the principle of Article 31, which 
requires a clear definition of any crime.
190
 It thus concluded that it was 
constitutional to impose criminal punishment on those who organized, 
solicited, or assisted illegal strikes, regardless of the severity of 
illegality.
191
 
The Supreme Court applied this reasoning to local public workers
192
 
and public corporation workers
193
 to explicitly overrule the All Postal 
Workers, Tokyo Central Post Office judgment. As a result, all public 
workers, including public corporation workers, have been deprived of the 
right to strike, and union leaders might be punished for organizing and 
soliciting the strike.  
The Supreme Court has simply come to stay away from interfering 
with politics under the name of the Constitution. The conservative, 
noninterventionist constitutional jurisprudence of the Supreme Court may 
be seen as an attempt to preserve judicial independence from political 
accusation by introducing self-restraint.
194
 
 
 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id.  
 192. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] May 21, 1976, 30 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 
1178 (grand bench). 
 193. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] May 4, 1977, 31 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 
182 (grand bench). The Supreme Court, while giving immunity from criminal punishment for mere 
participants in an illegal strike, concluded that the solicitation of leaders is punishable. 
 194. The Supreme Court has also adopted the attitude of controlling the lower court judges to 
make sure that they stay away from politics. Infra note 205 and accompanying text. For an argument 
that the tight control of the lower court judges by the Japanese Supreme Court may be viewed as an 
attempt to secure the independence of the judiciary, see generally John O. Haley, The Japanese 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss6/2
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C. Organizational Reasons  
Of course, the fact that until 2009 there had been practically no change 
of government since 1955 when the ruling LDP was formed might have a 
strong influence upon the composition of the Supreme Court. Almost all 
the Justices were appointed by the conservative LDP government. It is no 
wonder that the Supreme Court, made up of appointees chosen by the 
conservative LDP, came to adopt a highly conservative, noninterventionist 
constitutional jurisprudence.  
However, it is noteworthy that a custom has developed for the Chief 
Justice to recommend his successor to the Prime Minister and for the 
Prime Minister to follow that recommendation.
195
 The Chief Justice also 
recommends to the Prime Minister which candidates should succeed the 
retiring ten Associate Justices.
196
 Therefore, the Cabinet cannot just pick a 
candidate who shares a political ideology with the ruling party. The 
influence of the political ideology of the LDP upon the Justices is thus not 
direct. Yet, ever since the All Agricultural and Forest Workers, Police 
Office Act Amendment Opposition Case, the Supreme Court has basically 
clung to a conservative ideology and has adopted a policy of staying away 
from politics in order to maintain political independence. Therefore, the 
LDP Cabinet could simply trust the Supreme Court and accept its 
recommendations without worry. 
Of course, this custom probably best serves the interests of the ruling 
party, regardless of whether it is a conservative party or a liberal party. If 
the Prime Minister respects the recommendation of the Chief Justice, then 
the new appointees will probably be conservative noninterventionist 
Justices, without bringing any fear for the government that the Supreme 
Court might interfere with their public policy, no matter how conservative 
or liberal it may be. It is significant that when the JSP joined LDP to 
 
 
Judiciary: Maintaining Integrity, Autonomy, and the Public Trust, in LAW IN JAPAN: A TURNING 
POINT 99 (Daniel H. Foote ed., 2007). 
 195. NOMURA, supra note 19, at 54–56; MAINICHI SHIMBUN SHAKAIBU, KENSHO—SAIKŌ 
SAIBANSHO [THE SUPREME COURT RECONSIDERED] 263 (1991). 
 196. As we will see later, the composition of the Supreme Court is divided into three groups: six 
former judges, four attorneys, and five others, including two prosecutors, two bureaucrats, and one 
academic. With respect to the six former judges, the Supreme Court has broad discretion to 
recommend successors. TAKII, supra note 44, at 5. With respect to the four attorneys, the Supreme 
Court will make recommendations based on the recommendations of the Japan Federation of Bar 
Association, the national organization of all local bar associations. TAKII, supra note 44, at 8–9; see 
also SHAKAIBU, supra note 195, at 275–79. With respect to the five remaining members, the 
discretion of the government is much wider, although the Cabinet will make the appointment of 
Justices from the two prosecutors based on the recommendation from the Prosecutors’ Office. 
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create a coalition government in 1994, the socialist Prime Minister 
Tomiichi Murayama appointed the very conservative Chief Justice Touru 
Miyoshi, who was one of two dissenters in the Ehime Tamagushi Case, as 
recommended by the Chief Justice.
197
 It did not matter whether the 
appointee shared the same political ideology of the Prime Minister. Even 
after the change of government in 2009, the DPJ Prime Minister Yukio 
Hatoyama accepted the recommendations of the Chief Justice as to the 
appointment of new Associate Justices.
198
 If the Supreme Court wants to 
maintain its current attitude, then the Chief Justice can simply recommend 
the candidate who will stick to the current philosophy. So long as this 
custom is followed, it is likely that the Supreme Court will remain passive, 
regardless of who is controlling the government. 
Moreover, ever since the initial appointment, Justices of the Supreme 
Court have been divided into three different groups: lower court judges, 
attorneys, and others. Now, it is a custom to appoint six lower court 
judges, four attorneys, and five others, including two prosecutors, two 
government bureaucrats, and one scholar.
199
 As a result of this division, 
the majority of the Justices—eight out of the fifteen—are to be appointed 
from lower court judges and prosecutors. This will make sure that judges 
and prosecutors control the Supreme Court.  
In order to become a Supreme Court Justice from a lower court judge, 
one must pass the Bar Examination with a good grade, finish one’s legal 
training at the Legal Research and Training Institute of the Supreme Court 
with good marks, show the ability to make decisions as a judge and the 
amenability to work inside the judiciary, and be initially appointed as an 
 
 
 197. Saikō saibansho hanji ichiranhyō [List of the Supreme Court Justices], SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO, 
http://www.courts.go.jp/saikosai/about/saibankan/hanzi_itiran.html (last visited May 5, 2011) 
(indicating that Chief Justice Miyoshi was appointed on Nov. 7, 1995, while Murayama was prime 
minister); see also Law, supra note 1, at 1550–51. Professor Law argues that the Chief Justice 
practically has ―little or no say‖ in the selection of the Supreme Court Justices, since the selection is 
made based on the negotiation between the Cabinet Secretary and the Secretary General of the 
Supreme Court. Id. However, at least the Supreme Court has significant room to recommend 
candidates who do not share a political ideology with the Prime Minister.  
 198. Press Release, Cabinet Secretary (Nov. 27, 2009), available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/ 
jp/tyoukanpress/rireki/2009/11/27_a.html (announcing the appointment of three new Justices 
following the tradition); see also Press Release, Cabinet Secretary (Mar. 19, 2010), available at 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/tyoukanpress/201003/19_a.html (announcing the appointment of the second 
female justice on the Supreme Court, Justice Kiyoko Okabe, as a successor to Justice Tokiyasu Fujita, 
who was appointed from academics). Justice Okabe was a law school professor when she was 
appointed to replace Justice Fujita, but she served as a judge for more than fifteen years before she 
became an academic. Therefore, we might say that there are currently seven former judges, including 
Justice Okabe, while the academic spot was lost. 
 199. See supra note 196; see also TAKII, supra note 44, at 5–6. 
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assistant judge.
200
 To be reappointed after the ten-year term, the judge 
must show efficient management ability and abide by precedent.
201
 The 
judge must be promoted to a higher position through rotation across Japan, 
preferably working as an administrator in the General Secretariat or as a 
law clerk of the Supreme Court.
202
 The judge must then be appointed as 
Chief Judge of the High Court.
203
  
The image of judges, following the civil law tradition, is faceless 
judges who prefer to solve disputes by mechanically applying the law.
204
 
Judicial activism is not suited to this image of judges. Moreover, ever 
since the political backlash from conservative politicians against the 
Supreme Court’s willingness to limit criminal punishment on union 
leaders for solicitation of illegal strikes, the Supreme Court has demanded 
that judges keep away from politics. Through initial selection, subsequent 
promotion, and reappointment, the Supreme Court made clear that only 
conservative judges who are willing to follow the conservative decisions 
of the Supreme Court would be promoted and may play a managerial role 
inside the courts.
205
 In essence, it would be hard for liberal judges to climb 
this ladder up to the Supreme Court.
206
  
It is true that four members are chosen from attorneys, and it is a 
custom to accept the recommendation of the Japan Federation of Bar 
Associations (JFBA) as to their successors.
207
 It has been the custom to 
recommend a former president or vice president of one of the major bar 
associations, such as the three Tokyo Bar Associations or the Osaka Bar 
Association.
208
 Yet, in some cases, the Prime Minister has ignored the 
recommendation and selected an Associate Justice from among the 
conservative members of the bar.
209
 Moreover, the JFBA has to worry 
 
 
 200. Law, supra note 1, at 1551–54, 1556–58. 
 201. The lower court judges are appointed by the Cabinet from a list of persons nominated by the 
Supreme Court. ―All such judges shall hold office for a term of ten (10) years with privilege of 
reappointment, provided that they shall be retired upon the attainment of the age as fixed by law.‖ 
NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 80. The Supreme Court has viewed nomination for 
appointment and reappointment as wholly discretionary. 
 202. NOMURA, supra note 19, at 58; Law, supra note 1, at 1558. 
 203. NOMURA, supra note 19, at 58. 
 204. ITOH, supra note 165, at 132. 
 205. See generally J. MARK RAMSEYER & FRANCES MCCALL ROSENBLUTH, JAPAN’S 
POLITICAL MARKETPLACE 142–81 (1993). 
 206. ITOH, supra note 165, at 1551–64. 
 207. See supra note 196. See generally Lawrence Repeta, Reserving Seats for Attorneys and 
Scholars on Japan’s Supreme Court, 88 WASH U. L. REV. 1713 (2011). 
 208. MAINICH SHIMBUN SHAKAIBU, supra note 195, at 279. 
 209. NOMURA, supra note 19, at 54 (indicating that when Justice Koutarou Irokawa was to retire, 
the JFBA recommended three candidates to succeed him, yet the Cabinet chose Kiichiro Otsuka, who 
was not recommended by the JFBA). 
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about losing its seats on the Supreme Court if it recommends liberal 
candidates.
210
 Naturally, in consideration of this possibility, the JFBA 
might be inclined to recommend conservative attorneys to the Supreme 
Court.
211
 Even if a liberal attorney is appointed, such a Justice will be 
easily outnumbered by conservative Justices appointed from judges and 
prosecutors. 
It is more difficult to find an appointment of a liberal Justice from the 
prosecutors and bureaucrats.
212
 Prosecutors are career government 
lawyers, and most of the appointees have occupied high-ranking 
managerial positions inside the Prosecutors’ Office.213 Occasionally, some 
of the former bureaucrats, especially former diplomats, may play a 
somewhat liberal role. But most appointees were former high-ranking 
bureaucrats in the government or members of the Cabinet Legislation 
Bureau.
214
 It is highly unlikely for the Cabinet to appoint liberal academics 
to the Supreme Court.
215
 No constitutional academics have ever been 
appointed to the Supreme Court. 
Furthermore, although the minimum age for the appointment is forty 
years of age, a practice has developed to appoint candidates at the ages of 
sixty-four or sixty-five. This practice made the appointment to the 
Supreme Court a final honor for successful lower court judges after 
retirement, who must retire at the age of sixty-five. Moreover, there is 
some evidence to show that attorneys are generally appointed at a slightly 
higher age to make sure that liberal Justices, if appointed, would not stay 
on the bench for a long time.
216
 The fact that each Justice, including the 
Chief Justice, will stay in the office for only four or five years, is surely 
preventing the development of a more activist constitutional jurisprudence. 
Simply put, the appointment process of Supreme Court Justices is not 
designed to appoint Justices who are willing to actively exercise the power 
of judicial review. 
 
 
 210. There used to be five attorneys on the Supreme Court, but now there are only four. It is 
widely speculated that attorneys lost one spot because the Supreme Court wanted to make sure that 
conservative professional judges could dominate the Supreme Court. Law, supra note 1, at 1570. 
 211. See Law, supra note 1, at 1567–68. Recently, the JFBA introduced a reform to its 
recommendation procedure. See Repeta, supra note 207, at 1738. 
 212. See Law, supra note 1, at 1564–65. 
 213. See id. at 1565–66. 
 214. See id. at 1571–72. 
 215. See id. at 1572–74. 
 216. See id. at 1574–77. 
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D. Institutional Reasons 
There are also institutional reasons for the Supreme Court’s 
conservative constitutional jurisprudence. Japanese courts tend to believe 
that courts cannot hear cases unless they are granted jurisdiction by 
statutes passed by the Diet. Moreover, Japanese courts tend to assume that 
the remedy they could grant must be specified by statutes passed by the 
Diet. Since there is no statutory provision authorizing suits seeking 
declaration of unconstitutionality of a statute or an injunction before it is 
applied, and since there is doubt whether such suits satisfy the case or 
controversy requirement, courts have not accepted such suits. The absence 
of effective remedial power has surely significantly hurt the ability of the 
Supreme Court to effectively exercise the power of judicial review.  
In the United States, suits seeking declaratory relief and injunctions are 
very common in constitutional litigation.
217
 Therefore, civil rights 
organizations can seek the best case to test the constitutionality of a 
statute. Since no such preenforcement suits are allowed in Japan, most of 
the constitutional challenges are raised by criminal defendants. Often, they 
are not the best litigants to challenge the constitutionality of statutes, and 
judges generally tend to view constitutional challenges as meaningless last 
straws for criminal defendants. Judges are extremely reluctant to let 
criminals go free because of the unconstitutionality of a statute. It is thus 
difficult to expect unconstitutional rulings in such cases.
218
 
Moreover, as noted above, because of the difficulty of challenging 
administrative orders, it is also difficult to challenge administrative actions 
on constitutional grounds. It is noteworthy that the number of 
administrative cases filed each year is somewhere between 3000 and 
4000,
219
 a very small number, and in more than ninety percent of those 
cases, the government wins the litigation.
220
  
 
 
 217. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (a suit filed by a pregnant woman seeking a 
declaratory judgment that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were unconstitutional on their face, and 
an injunction restraining the defendant, a district attorney, from enforcing the statutes). 
 218. The Parricide Case, Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, 27 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI 
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 265 (grand bench), is exceptional. The defendant was raped by her father and 
was forced to live like his wife, bearing five children. When she fell in love with another man and told 
her father that she wanted to marry that man, her father was so angry that he imprisoned her for ten 
days, intimidating and abusing her. In desperation, she strangled her father to death and went to the 
police. Many believe that it was her father who was to be blamed and that she should not be sent to 
jail.  
 219. SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN, JUDICIAL STATISTICS, CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CASES 5 
(2009), available at http://www.courts.go.jp/sihotokei/nenpo/pdf/B21DMIN1-2.pdf. 
 220. See Proposals for Judicial Reform, JAPAN FEDERATION OF BAR ASSOCIATION (1990), 
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It is also true that the caseload of the Supreme Court and the absence of 
discretion on the part of the Supreme Court to choose what appeals it will 
hear have contributed to judicial passivism. Despite the fact that parties 
can no longer appeal erroneous findings of facts or improper sentencing to 
the Supreme Court,
221
 many criminal defendants file appeals with the 
Supreme Court alleging constitutional error in the rulings below just for 
the purpose of attracting Supreme Court review.
222
 Moreover, before the 
1996 amendment, parties to a civil litigation could appeal to the Supreme 
Court whenever there was an error of law.
223
 Although the 1996 
amendment revised the Code of Civil Procedure to only allow the 
acceptance of a case through a petition, still a significant number of civil 
cases are appealed or petitioned. As a result, the number of civil cases 
filed with the Supreme Court reached 5000, and new criminal cases 
reached 4000.
224
 Each Justice thus must handle some 600 cases as the 
responsible Justice and participate in some 3000 cases as a member of the 
petty bench every year. This is an overwhelming number of cases for 
Justices over the age of sixty-five.
225
 This inhibiting caseload has also 
prevented the Supreme Court from concentrating on constitutional cases. 
This is especially true since the constitutional cases occupy a small portion 
of the caseload, and therefore Justices cannot devote their energy to the 
constitutional cases.
226
 
This caseload also makes it difficult to hold grand bench review. 
During the early days, almost all cases were decided by the grand bench. 
Gradually, however, the number of grand bench decisions declined, and 
nowadays the grand bench reviews only one or two cases per year.
227
 
Since Justices are simply very busy with their petty bench reviews, and 
since it would take extraordinary effort to schedule a grand bench review, 
Justices are more willing to dismiss the case based on precedent rather 
than send the case to the grand bench.
228
  
 
 
available at http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/ja/opinion/ga_res/1990_3.html. 
 221. Supra note 36, 38. 
 222. TAKII, supra note 44, at 24. 
 223. Supra note 37. 
 224. SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN, JUDICIAL STATISTICS, CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CASES 2 
(2009), available at http://www.courts.go.jp/sihotokei/nenpo/pdf/B21DMIN1-1.pdf; SUPREME COURT 
OF JAPAN, JUDICIAL STATISTICS, CRIMINAL CASES 2 (2009), available at http://www.courts.go.jp/ 
sihotokei/nenpo/pdf/B21DKEI01.pdf. 
 225. See Law, supra note 1, at 1577–79. 
 226. ITOH, supra note 165, at 124. 
 227. TAKII, supra note 44, at 28. 
 228. ITOH, supra note 165, at 129–30: TAKII, supra note 44, at 44–45. The Gifu Youth Protection 
Ordinance Case, Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 19, 1989, 43 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ 
[KEISHŪ] 785 (3d petty bench), is a good example. Although the Supreme Court rejected the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss6/2
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This inhibiting caseload makes it imperative to allow law clerks to 
review the files and make recommendations for the Supreme Court. It also 
makes it practically inevitable that the Supreme Court will allow law 
clerks to write draft opinions. Law clerks, who are all veteran judges, thus 
play a significant role in the Japanese Supreme Court. Some have 
criticized the excessive influence of these law clerks on the opinions of the 
Supreme Court.
229
  
E. Strategic Reasons 
There may be strategic reasons for the conservativeness of the Supreme 
Court as well. The Supreme Court might have believed that it needed more 
time to accumulate prestige for the Supreme Court before striking down 
statutes passed by the legislature, elected by the public. Even in the United 
States, it took some fifty years to strike down another federal law after the 
United States Supreme Court had established the power of judicial 
review.
230
 The Supreme Court of Japan might have believed that it needed 
to wait a while before actively exercising the power of judicial review 
granted by the Constitution in 1946. 
The Supreme Court might have opted to encourage a political solution 
rather than strike down government actions. Striking down statutes 
requires tremendous energy on the part of Justices and might lead to 
outright confrontation between the political branch and the judiciary. 
Therefore, Justices are often more willing to express a wish for the 
political process to solve the issue or strongly encourage it to do 
something, rather than attack the government action.
231
  
 
 
constitutional attack by citing precedent, none of them directly related to the constitutionality of the 
restrictions on freedom of expression for the protection of youth. Id. See Shigenori Matsui, 
Constitutional Precedents in Japan: A Comment on the Role of Precedent, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1669 
(2011). It is believed that the third petty bench did not want to transfer the case to the grand bench. 
TAKII, supra note 44, at 52–53. 
 229. For the strong influence of the law clerks, see NOMURA, supra note 19, at 47–48; Law, supra 
note 1, at 1579–86. 
 230. The United States Supreme Court established the power of judicial review in 1803 in 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), and it took almost fifty years before it exercised 
this power of judicial review to strike down another federal law in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 
(1857). 
 231. YASUHIRO OKUDAIRA, KENPŌ SOSHŌ NO KANOUSEI [THE POSSIBILITY OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION] 135–50 (1995). For example, in the Discrimination Against 
Illegitimate Child Case, Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 5, 1995, 49 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI 
HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1789 (grand bench), four Justices rejected the constitutional attack but 
suggested the possibility of legislative reconsideration by doubting the reasonableness of the 
discrimination against illegitimate children. Five dissenters held the discrimination unreasonable and 
would have invalidated the provision. Id. 
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Litigants also know the difficulty of asking the Supreme Court to strike 
down statutes. Although they ask the Supreme Court to strike down 
statutes, they expect the constitutional litigation to become a means of 
attracting media attention and mobilizing the public to force the 
government to change the law or its policy. Sometimes lawyers argue the 
case, not to the judges, but to the supporters and media reporters sitting in 
the courtrooms. They tend to make the arguments most acceptable to the 
supporters and the public and not the most powerful legal arguments to 
convince the judges. It would be a relief to those lawyers if the Supreme 
Court encouraged support through the political process even when it 
rejects the suit. 
This strategy occasionally works. The government is sometimes forced 
to change its practice under pressure from the public and media as a result 
of litigation.
232
 The outcome of the litigation does not matter. This strategy 
surely prevents the effort to win the case before the courts. 
Moreover, in Japan, the bills submitted by the government to the Diet 
must be scrutinized by legal experts of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau 
before submission.
233
 The Supreme Court must feel that, since the bills 
were already examined by these legal experts, it is unlikely that the Diet 
will pass such manifestly arbitrary legislation.
234
 Professor Yasuo Hasebe 
also points out that, in addition to the existence of the Cabinet Legislation 
Bureau, the peculiar staffing of the Ministry of Justice may have 
contributed to judicial passivism.
235
 Hasebe points out that the Ministry of 
Justice, which is in charge of much legislation, including the Civil and 
Criminal Code, is actually staffed by judges, who are seconded by the 
Supreme Court to serve as government attorneys and who are supposed to 
 
 
 232. For instance, many municipalities stopped spending public funds on ground-breaking 
ceremonies after a citizen filed a suit in the Tsu City Ground–Breaking Ceremony Case, Saikō 
Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 13, 1977, 31 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 533 (grand 
bench), even though the Supreme Court ultimately upheld the public spending. Similarly, the Ministry 
of Welfare significantly raised welfare assistance when it was challenged in the Asahi Case, Saikō 
Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] May 24, 1967, 21 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1043 (grand 
bench), even though the Supreme Court dismissed the suit and upheld the decision of the Welfare 
Minister in dictum. Furthermore, the government decided to stop evening flights at the Osaka 
International Airport, even though the Supreme Court rejected a suit for injunctive relief against 
evening flights in the Osaka International Airport Case, Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 16, 1981, 35 
SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1368 (grand bench). 
 233. ITOH, supra note 165, at 126; About the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, CABINET LEGISLATION 
BUREAU, http://www.clb.go.jp/english/ about.html (last visited May 5, 2011). 
 234. ITOH, supra note 165, at 126. 
 235. Yasuo Hasebe, The Supreme Court of Japan: Its Adjudication on Electoral Systems and 
Economic Freedoms, 5 INT’L J. CONST. L. 296, 298–300 (2007). 
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return to the courts as judges after their service.
236
 It is natural for judges, 
according to Hasebe, to respect the legislation that their colleagues have 
made.
237
 Or the Supreme Court may be making a strategic decision to 
elevate the status of the judiciary by paying high respect to the legislation 
drafted by the judges it sent to the Ministry of Justice. 
F. Constitutional Positivism and the Reluctance to View the Constitution 
as a Positive Law 
It is hard to pick a single reason for the conservatism of the Supreme 
Court of Japan. All these reasons combined have probably contributed to 
the conservatism. What is most alarming, though, is the fact that the 
Constitution is regarded with distrust, or at least with caution, by the 
Justices. Many Justices tend to view the Constitution not as a law, but 
more as a political document stipulating political principles.
238
 The fact 
that the Constitution has not been regarded as law to be applied by judges 
is the most unfortunate reason for judicial passivism.  
It is true that the language of the Constitution is rather general and 
abstract. Many of the constitutional provisions can be seen as embodying 
principles and not rules. For judges trained in the civil law tradition, this 
will present a difficulty when having to specify the rules in the 
Constitution and apply them in specific cases. The use of judicial 
creativity to give concrete meaning to the text of the Constitution or to 
give shape to constitutional values is something alien to judges trained in 
the civil law tradition. Yet, the Constitution is a law enacted by the people 
to be applied by the judges. It is not a document simply proclaiming 
political principles. The most disturbing factor behind judicial passivism 
has been the failure of many judges to treat the Constitution as law to be 
enforced by the courts. 
Related to this thinking is the positivism of judges in Japan. Even 
though the judicial power is vested in the courts by the Constitution, most 
of the judges tend to view statutes passed by the Diet as the only source of 
law within their power. As a result, most judges are reluctant to assert 
power that cannot be found in statutes.  
For instance, there used to be no provisions in the Code of Civil 
Procedure or the Administrative Case Litigation Act that authorized courts 
to issue injunctions against administrative agencies to restrain them from 
 
 
 236. Id. at 299–300. 
 237. Id. at 300. 
 238. ITOH, supra note 165, at 127–28. 
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enforcing unconstitutional statutes. As a result, Japanese courts have been 
very reluctant to entertain suits for injunctive relief against the 
enforcement of allegedly unconstitutional statutes. There is no provision in 
Japan authorizing judges to punish disobedience of a court order as 
contempt of court, and, as a result, Japanese judges tend to believe that 
there is no effective remedy even when their injunctions are not followed 
by the parties except to impose monetary sanctions for disobedience. They 
do not believe that the Constitution, by vesting judicial power in the 
judiciary, gave judges the constitutional power to either grant appropriate 
remedies regardless of the statutes or to punish contempt of court as an 
inherent power. Thinking of this kind has seriously impaired the power of 
the judges and courts. 
This kind of positivism and the reluctance of Justices to view the 
Constitution as positive law are quite noteworthy, since the Japanese 
Supreme Court has showed its creativity and flexibility in fashioning 
unwritten principles in other fields of law. For instance, the Labor 
Standards Act demands that the employer give a thirty-day advance notice 
of dismissal to the employee and requires the employer to pay thirty days’ 
salary if no advance notice is given.
239
 This provision might indicate that 
the employer could terminate the employment contract if he or she pays 
thirty days’ salary. Yet, in reality, the Supreme Court has developed a 
judicial doctrine demanding compelling reasons to dismiss an employee 
and requiring that the dismissal be the last resort.
240
 This means that even 
when a company is in financial trouble, the company cannot fire its 
employees unless the dismissal is necessary to save the company and the 
company exhausted all other alternatives before dismissal. These decisions 
are very liberal in the sense that they protect the rights of workers. 
The Interest Limitation Act places a limit on the interest rate loan 
companies can charge to consumers (fifteen to twenty percent per year 
depending upon the amount of the loan) and provides that any contract 
that charges a higher interest rate is invalid.
241
 Yet, one could not claim 
reimbursement once one made a voluntary payment at a higher interest.
242
 
Moreover, the Loan Company Act had a provision viewing the voluntary 
 
 
 239. Rōdō kijunhō [Labor Standards Act], Law No. 49 of 1947, art 20, para. 1.  
 240. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 31, 1977, 120 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO SAIBANSHŪ MINJI 
[SAIBANSHŪ MINJI] 23 (2d petty bench). The Diet enacted the Rōdō keiyakuhō [Labor Contract Act] 
in 2007 and codified this requirement. Rōdō keiyakuhō [Labor Contract Act], Law No. 128 of 2007, 
art. 16.  
 241. Risoku seigenhō [Interest Limitation Act], Law No. 100 of 1954, art. 1. 
 242. Id. art. 1, para. 2 (provision at issue deleted in 2006); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 13, 
1962, 16 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1340 (grand bench). 
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payment of a higher interest rate as a payment for interest even if the 
contract is invalid.
243
 This means that the original loan amount would not 
be reduced even if the consumer paid a higher interest. The Investment 
Act limits the permissible interest rate to 29.2% per year and imposes 
criminal punishment on those who violate this limit.
244
 As a result, many 
loan companies charged interest rates higher than those stipulated in the 
Interest Rate Limitation Act, but lower than the limits imposed by the 
Investment Act, and accepted voluntary payment for a higher interest rate 
as a payment of interest. Many consumers were thus forced to pay the 
higher interest rate.  
The Supreme Court interpreted these provisions, however, as allowing 
consumers to pay the original amount of the loan even if they intended to 
pay a higher interest.
245
 The consumers who paid off all of the original 
loan amount could claim reimbursement of payment for the additional 
higher interest.
246
 Moreover, if the consumers are practically forced to pay 
the higher interest, then the payment should not be viewed as a voluntary 
payment.
247
 This holding forced loan companies to prove that the payment 
of higher interest is truly voluntary, an almost impossible task. The 
practical result of these holdings is to force loan companies to stick to the 
limits imposed by the Interest Rate Limitation Act and to return the money 
they received from customers for impermissibly high interest rates. These 
holdings are creative and flexible uses of judicial power to protect 
consumers and could be viewed as very liberal. 
Yet, the Supreme Court has never applied the same kind of liberal 
attitude in constitutional cases. The reason for this difference may be 
found in the relative difficulty of changing constitutional holdings 
compared with changing statutory interpretations. If dissatisfied with a 
judicial interpretation of a statute, the Diet can simply pass another piece 
of legislation to deny the interpretation of the Supreme Court; however, it 
 
 
 243. Kashikingyō no kiseitō ni kansuru hōritsu [Act on Regulating Loan Companies], Law No. 32 
of 1983, art. 43 (renamed as Kashikingyōhō [Loan Company Act]; Article 43 was deleted and replaced 
with another provision in 2006 after the decisions of the Supreme Court). 
 244. Shusshi no ukeire, azukarikin oyobi kinritō no torishimari ni kansuru hōritsu [Act 
Concerning Regulation of Acceptance of Investment, Deposit and Interest, Investment Act for short], 
Law No. 195 of 1954, art. 5. The limit was eventually lowered to 20% for loan companies who lend 
money as a business. Id. art. 5, para. 2. 
 245. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 18, 1964, 18 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ 
[MINSHŪ] 1868 (grand bench). 
 246. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 13, 1968, 22 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ 
[MINSHŪ] 2526 (grand bench). 
 247. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 13, 2006, 60 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
1 (2d petty bench). 
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would require the approval of a two-thirds majority in each of the two 
Houses of the Diet and the majority approval of the public to amend the 
Constitution to overturn a judicial interpretation of the Constitution.
248
 The 
Supreme Court might worry that a flexible and creative constitutional 
interpretation might undermine the parliamentary democracy and lead to 
an intolerable limitation on the majority’s will. 
This concern is surely justified. But it does not dictate the extreme 
judicial conservatism that the Supreme Court has created during the past 
sixty years. Careful exercise of the power of judicial review is one thing, 
but it is a totally different thing to practically abandon any active role in 
controlling the Diet. The existence of a system of public review of 
Supreme Court Justices could function as an effective check against 
possible abuses of the power of judicial review by the Supreme Court.
249
 
There must be some room for the Supreme Court to play a far more active 
role. 
V. SOLUTIONS 
A. Establishment of a Constitutional Court 
One solution, which has attracted much support, is a constitutional 
amendment that introduces a Constitutional Court, similar to the Federal 
Constitutional Court of Germany. Justice Itoh has supported this 
proposal.
250
 The introduction of a Constitutional Court is also included in 
many proposals for constitutional amendment.
251
 For instance, the 
proposal for constitutional amendment by the Yomiuri Newspaper would 
establish the Constitutional Court in addition to the Supreme Court and 
lower courts.
252
 It would grant to the Constitutional Court the power of 
reviewing the constitutionality of legislation based upon reference by the 
 
 
 248. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 96, para. 1. 
 249. Currently, the system of public review has not functioned as anticipated. Since the public 
must evaluate the Justices soon after their appointment, the public does not have sufficient information 
as to what kind of opinions the Justices might have. Moreover, most of the Justices are appointed at 
the age of sixty-four or sixty-five and retire at the age of seventy. No Justice will likely face another 
public review. In fact, no Justice has ever been dismissed. There is surely a risk that this system can be 
used to expel unpopular Justices. Yet, so long as the Court is performing its appropriate role, we must 
trust the public not to abuse this system.  
 250. ITOH, supra note 165, at 134–37. 
 251. Some Important Points on Constitutional Amendment, LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY, 
http://www.jimin.jp/jimin/jimin/2004_seisaku/kenpou/index.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2011); see 
YOMIURI SHIMBUN, KENPŌKAISEI—YOMIURI SHIAN 2004 [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT—
YOMIURI PROPOSAL IN 2004] (2004) [hereinafter YOMIURI PROPOSAL]. 
 252. YOMIURI PROPOSAL, supra note 251, art. 86. 
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Cabinet or one-third of the members of the House of Representatives or 
the House of Councillors, the power of reviewing specific constitutional 
questions referred to the Constitutional Court by the Supreme Court or 
lower courts, and the power of reviewing the constitutional judgments of 
the Supreme Court based upon petition from the parties.
253
 It would also 
grant legal binding effect to an unconstitutional judgment for all the 
agencies and departments of the national government, as well as local 
governments.
254
 The Constitutional Court would consist of one Chief 
Justice and eight Associate Justices.
255
 Based upon the decisions of the 
House of Councillors, the Emperor would appoint the Chief Justice,
256
 and 
the Cabinet would appoint the Associate Justices.
257
 The term of office for 
the Justices would be eight years, and no reappointment could be made.
258
 
Justices would also retire at an age designated by the statute.
259
  
Yet, is the introduction of a Constitutional Court capable of 
overcoming judicial passivism in Japan? Would it be desirable? I 
personally doubt both the possibility and desirability of such change. First 
of all, the current judicial passivism of the Supreme Court is not caused by 
the institutional design of judicial review. The United States Supreme 
Court, equipped with the power of judicial review in specific cases or 
controversies, invalidates several statutes every year,
260
 and similarly 
nothing prevents the Japanese Supreme Court from exercising its own 
power of judicial review more actively.  
Second, the introduction of a Constitutional Court would surely make it 
much easier for citizens to challenge the constitutionality of legislation 
and other governmental acts, especially if they are allowed to file suits 
directly in the Constitutional Court when their rights and liberties are 
infringed.
261
 Moreover, if one-third of the members of either House can 
refer a matter to the Constitutional Court, it is likely that any legislation 
passed despite the opposition will end up before the Constitutional Court. 
Yet, even if it becomes much easier for the citizens to file a suit in the 
Constitutional Court or all legislation ends up challenged before the 
 
 
 253. Id. art. 87. 
 254. Id. art. 88. 
 255. Id. art. 89, para. 1. 
 256. Id. art. 8, para. 2. 
 257. Id. art. 89, para. 1 
 258. Id. art 89, para. 2.  
 259. Id. art. 89, para. 3. 
 260. The Supreme Court Database, WASHINGTON UNIV. IN ST. LOUIS, http://scdb.wustl.edu/ 
analysis.php (last visited May 5, 2011). 
 261. It is significant that the proposal of the Yomiuri Newspaper does not grant citizens the right 
to file a suit directly in the Constitutional Court when their rights are infringed. 
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Constitutional Court, the Constitutional Court might reject all these 
challenges by paying the same kind of deference to the Diet as the 
Supreme Court does now, in which case the same judicial passivism will 
continue. It is important to appoint judges to the Constitutional Court who 
are more willing to scrutinize legislation and governmental actions and are 
more willing to strike them down. If we can make sure that the 
appointment would require the support of a two-thirds’ majority of each 
House, for instance, as in Germany, then maybe we could secure the 
appointment of a diversified group of judges. Perhaps, it may be possible 
to appoint university professors who are experts in constitutional law to 
serve as judges of the Constitutional Court, as has been the case in 
Germany.
262
 However, there is no guarantee that such an appointment 
system would accompany the introduction of a Constitutional Court. There 
is no incentive on the part of the government to support such an 
appointment system, even if it were to agree to introduce a Constitutional 
Court.  
Even though the Yomiuri proposal would grant the power of selection 
to the House of Councillors, the House of Councillors is likely to choose 
judges who share its political ideology when it is controlled by the same 
political party as the House of Representatives. In that case, the judges 
would be unwilling to subject statutes passed by the Diet with the support 
of the majority of the ruling party to close scrutiny. If the opposition 
parties control the House of Councillors, then there is surely a possibility 
that the judges selected by the House of Councillors would be willing to 
engage in a more active judicial review against the majority in the House 
of Representatives. Giving the power of selection to the House of 
Councillors does not guarantee that the Constitutional Court will be 
staffed with judges who are willing to exercise the power of judicial 
review more actively. 
Furthermore, the existing judicial review system, which allows all 
courts to review the constitutionality of legislation and other governmental 
actions but requires the existence of an actual case or controversy in order 
to decide a constitutional question, has some merit compared with the 
Constitutional Court system. It allows the courts to review the 
constitutionality of legislation and other governmental action in light of 
specific factual situations and allows judges to decide constitutional 
questions in light of a sincere and robust dialogue between two adversarial 
 
 
 262. Justices of the Federal Constitutional Court, BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT [FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF GERMANY], http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/judges.html (last 
visited May 5, 2011). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss6/2
  
 
 
 
 
2011] WHY IS THE COURT SO CONSERVATIVE? 1419 
 
 
 
 
parties. The Constitutional Court, however, will decide the 
constitutionality without any specific case or controversy. It would review 
the constitutionality based upon the text of the statute in its totality. Such a 
review would be difficult and may lose sight of the problems, which might 
appear only after the statute is actually applied in a specific case. It is 
undesirable to abandon these advantages in exchange for easy access to 
the courts. 
What would be the best solution then? 
B. The Possibility of Reform 
I agree that relaxation of threshold requirements to seek judicial review 
is necessary. The Supreme Court must be allowed to exercise the power of 
judicial review more broadly, and it must be granted the power to use 
more effective remedies. The Administrative Case Litigation Act should 
be radically amended or abolished to make it easier for the public to file a 
suit against the government and to seek effective remedies. Moreover, the 
suit to seek declaration of unconstitutionality of a statute and injunction 
against its application should be admitted. The government should be 
liable for damages when the Diet enacts unconstitutional statutes. These 
changes could be brought by an explicit statutory amendment or 
enactment, but could be similarly brought by the change in interpretation. 
How can we make the Supreme Court exercise the power of judicial 
review more actively? I concede that the absence of change in the 
government has surely contributed to the conservative jurisprudence of the 
Supreme Court. Yet, the Cabinet has developed the custom of respecting 
the wishes of the Supreme Court regarding the appointment of 
replacement Justices. So long as this tradition is followed, even if there is 
a change of government, the new government will simply follow this 
tradition and appoint recommended successors to the Supreme Court. 
Then, there would be no significant change in the constitutional 
jurisprudence of the Court. 
In order to make the Supreme Court actively exercise the power of 
judicial review, the appointment process must be radically modified. First, 
the tradition of respecting the wishes of the Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court must be discarded. The Cabinet must be more actively involved in 
the search for Supreme Court Justices. Moreover, the traditional quota 
among Justices must be abandoned. There is no need to keep the quota of 
six former judges, four former attorneys, and five others, including two 
prosecutors, two bureaucrats, and one university professor. The Cabinet 
should select the most appropriate candidates for the Supreme Court. 
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Furthermore, the Cabinet should choose much younger Justices. The term 
of office is too short for a Justice to develop his or her own constitutional 
jurisprudence. Moreover, as a result, the position of Supreme Court Justice 
has become a final honorary position to former chief judges of the High 
Court, former presidents or vice presidents of the major bar associations, 
and former high-ranking public prosecutors and bureaucrats. If they are 
appointed in their forties or fifties, they can stay on the Supreme Court for 
more than ten or twenty years and will have sufficient time to develop 
their own constitutional jurisprudences. This will prevent Justices from 
treating their positions as final honorary positions after retirement. 
This scenario naturally raises the possibility of the appointment of 
Justices based partly on political considerations. The Prime Minister 
would choose the Justices based on the political ideology of judges. There 
is surely a possibility that the Supreme Court would be staffed with 
Justices sharing the same political ideology as the government. Yet, so 
long as there is an occasional change of government, such danger would 
be kept to a minimum. If there were a frequent change of government, 
members of the Supreme Court would be divided into different groups of 
different political ideologies. Moreover, the Justices selected by the same 
government would not necessarily share the same legal or constitutional 
philosophy on every issue. Of course, some mechanism for obtaining the 
expert opinions of judges, prosecutors, attorneys, and academics might be 
useful for the appointment process. An advisory board for appointments 
was used when the Court was first established but has not been used since. 
Some type of advisory board might be useful.  
At the same time, the caseload of the Supreme Court must be 
significantly reduced to allow the Supreme Court to focus on 
constitutional issues. Giving the Supreme Court total control over its own 
docket would be the best way to reduce the caseload and allow the 
Supreme Court to choose constitutional cases and cases that implicate 
significant legal questions that divide the High Courts.
263
 If the caseload 
were significantly reduced, the Justices might be able to write the opinions 
 
 
 263. Eiji Sasada doubts the constitutionality of giving total discretion to the Supreme Court on 
whether or not to accept appeals. He proposes instead the establishment of a Special High Court to 
hear appeals from the High Court and the change to the Supreme Court consisting of one bench of nine 
members, which would accept constitutional cases—cases which would necessitate alteration of 
precedent and cases which present significant new legal issues. EIJI SASADA, SHIHOU NO HEN-YOU 
TO KENPŌ [CHANGES IN JUDICIARY AND THE CONSTITUTION] 15 (2008). So long as the Supreme 
Court has discretion to decide whether or not to accept an appeal, however, the right of access to 
justice guaranteed in Article 32 would not be infringed. 
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personally. In any case, it is important for the Justices to realize that they 
cannot correct all of the injustices committed in the lower courts.
264
  
If their caseload was reduced, the number of Justices could be reduced 
from fifteen to nine, and the division between the grand bench and petty 
benches could also be abolished. The Supreme Court could hear and 
decide cases as a single bench. The current petty bench system is not well 
designed to facilitate constitutional review. The petty bench system 
precludes Justices from hearing constitutional cases. It prevents all the 
Justices from hearing and arguing constitutional questions as a single 
court. Abolishing the division between the grand and the petty benches 
and allowing nine Justices to sit together in all cases would significantly 
contribute to the collective effort to solve constitutional issues as a single 
court.  
Finally, the Supreme Court should treat the Constitution as law to be 
applied by judges.
265
 Even though its provisions are general and abstract, 
they embody legal principles that are entitled to judicial application. If the 
Supreme Court began to treat constitutional provisions as another form of 
positive law, then there would be no hurdles for the courts to apply them 
in specific disputes.  
Of course, it is the Constitution, rather than a statute passed by the 
Diet, that the Supreme Court must interpret in adjudicating a constitutional 
attack. Compared with statutory interpretation, constitutional 
interpretation is more difficult to overturn. Based upon the popular 
sovereignty principle, the Constitution gave the legislative power to the 
Diet, as ―the highest organ of state power‖ and ―the sole law-making organ 
of the State.‖266 Although total deference toward the Diet is unjustified, 
elevating the Supreme Court over the Diet as a super-legislature is also 
unjustified. There must be a legitimate role for the Supreme Court to play 
in a representative democracy established by the Constitution.  
 
 
 264. But see TAKII, supra note 44, at 41 (arguing that it is difficult for the Supreme Court to turn a 
blind eye to injustices committed in the lower courts and refuse review). 
 265. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177–78 (1803) (―It is emphatically the province 
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, 
must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must 
decide on the operation of each. So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the 
constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably to the 
law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law; the court 
must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of 
judicial duty. If then the courts are to regard the constitution; and the constitution is superior to any 
ordinary act of the legislature; the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to 
which they both apply.‖). 
 266. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 41. 
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It is well established among academics that the courts should adopt 
constitutional double standards: the courts should distinguish economic 
freedom from personal freedom, including freedom of expression, and 
employ a more stringent standard of review for restrictions on personal 
freedom.
267
 Yet, many constitutional academics expect the Supreme Court 
to play a much larger role.
268
 They want the Supreme Court to vindicate 
the pacifism clause of Article 9 and protect economic freedoms as well as 
the welfare right. I believe, however, that they are simply asking too much 
from the Supreme Court. They are expecting the Supreme Court to play a 
role far beyond that justified under the Constitution. 
In this sense, the direction showed by the Japanese Supreme Court in 
the two Reapportionment Cases, the recent Overseas Voters Case, and the 
Illegitimate Children Nationality Discrimination Case might prove to be 
justified. The Supreme Court might as well protect the democratic process 
based upon the popular sovereignty principle, while paying respect to the 
outcome of the political process.
269
 Such direction might be the best way 
for the Japanese Supreme Court to engage in limited activism, while 
avoiding the charge that the undemocratic institution is unduly restricting 
the political process. After all, the Supreme Court is not an elected 
institution, and its power must be justified in light of democratic 
principles. In order to do that, the Supreme Court must employ heightened 
scrutiny in freedom of expression and voting rights cases. If such hurdles 
to citizen participation in politics can be lifted, then we are likely to see 
changes of government more often. Then, the Supreme Court would not 
have to keep such a distance from politics. 
CONCLUSION 
Without doubt, the constitutional jurisprudence developed by the 
Japanese Supreme Court is very conservative. Judges are conservative in 
their nature, especially in civil-law countries. Yet, equipped with the 
power of judicial review, Japanese judges are entrusted to enforce the 
Constitution against the Diet and the Cabinet. It is surely an appropriate 
time to reconsider whether the judicial conservatism of the Japanese 
 
 
 267. ASHIBE, supra note 32, at 101–02, 181–84; SATŌ, supra note 32, at 514. 
 268. ASHIBE, supra note 32, at 61, 214, 255; SATŌ, supra note 32, at 558–59, 623; HIDEKI 
SHIBUTANI, KENPŌ [CONSTITUTION] 67–68, 262, 275–76 (2007). 
 269. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW (1980); SHIGENORI MATSUI, NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [JAPANESE CONSTITUTION] 96–98 (3d 
ed. 2007); SHIGENORI MATSUI, NIJŪNO KIJUNRON [CONSTITUTIONAL DOUBLE STANDARDS] 
(1994). 
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Supreme Court is justified and what role the Supreme Court ought to play 
in constitutional democracy in Japan. 
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